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I. INTRODUCTION: CITY POWER AND STATE PUSHBACK
It is widely accepted that the U.S. Constitution has little to say about 
the relationship between states and the cities within them, which have
long been conceived as mere administrative subunits of the state.1  This
“state creature” doctrine2 would likely come as a surprise to most city
residents.  From Keep Austin Weird3 to Charm City4 to Boston Strong,5 
city residents often boast of a unique local culture and hometown pride. 
Cities are communities—“groups of people with shared concerns and
values, tied up with the history and circumstances of the particular place 
in which they are located.”6  As communities, cities also have their own 
political culture. Particularly in the large, urban municipalities that the 
word “city” generally brings to mind,7 the culture is often overwhelmingly
 1. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (“Municipal
corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for 
exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be [en]trusted to them.”); 
David J. Barron, The Problem of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147
U. PA. L. REV. 487, 487 (1999) (stating that state creature doctrine is “black-letter”
constitutional law). 
2. See, e.g., Richmond, F. & P.R. Co. v. City of Richmond, 133 S.E. 800, 803–04
(1926) (noting that municipal corporations are “creatures of the state”). 
3.  Jim Yardley, Austin Journal; A Slogan Battle Keeps Austin Weird, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 8, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/08/us/austin-journal-a-slogan-battle-keeps- 
austin-weird.html?mcubz=0.
 4. Gilbert Sandler, How the City’s Nickname Came To Be, BALT. SUN (July 18, 1995), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1995-07-18/news/1995199190_1_charm-city-bill-evans-
loden [https://perma.cc/26LL-S9RV].
5. Kyle Scott Clauss, Does ‘Boston Strong’ Mean Anything Anymore?, BOS.
DAILY (Apr. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2016/04/17/ 
boston-strong/ [https://perma.cc/9MRE-79PU]. 
 6. Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 259 
(2004).
7. This Article uses the term “city” to mean any unit of municipal government, 
although as a practical matter, many preemption battles involve laws passed by large, urban 
municipalities. The notable exception is fracking, which often involves suburbs and small-
town municipalities. See, e.g., Jim Malewitz, Texas Drops Suit over Dead Denton Fracking 
Ban, TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 18, 2015, 11:00 AM), www.texastribune.org/2015/09/18/texas-drops-
suit-over-dead-denton-fracking-ban [https://perma.cc/94MY-VXMY] (discussing legal and
legislative action over a fracking ban in Denton, Texas, a suburb of the Dallas–Fort Worth
metro region). 
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Democratic.8 This is no coincidence: recent decades have seen Americans
“sort[ing]” themselves geographically into like-minded communities— 
so much so that so that as a statistical matter, population density correlates 
with surprising accuracy to political affiliation.9  Huge Democratic majorities
have allowed cities to advance policies unimaginable at any other level of 
government, particularly on progressive issues ranging from climate change
to the minimum wage and from gun control to LGBTQ rights.10 Cities 
are routinely praised—particularly by those who favor such policies—as
incubators of policy leadership11 and leaders on the global stage.12 
But the “big sort”—combined with the lack of limitations on political
gerrymandering13—also means that while urban electorates bleed blue, state
election maps sweep red.  After the 2016 elections, Republicans enjoyed 
8. See Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption, Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 133, 136–37 (2017).
9. BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA
IS TEARING US APART 205 (2008) (noting that high density correlates with Democratic 
voters); see also Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part I—The Urban Disadvantage in
National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287, 292–98 (2016). 
10. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 6, at 254; Matthey J. Parlow, Progressive Policy-
Making on the Local Level: Rethinking Traditional Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. &
C.R. L. REV. 371, 375 (2007).  Ironically, however, municipal power has long come under 
scholarly criticism for facilitating sprawl, enabling exclusionary zoning, and creating other 
decidedly non-progressive results. See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L.
REV. 1113, 1132 (2007). 
11. See generally BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION:
HOW CITIES AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY
(2013); Jamie Bartlett, Return of the City-State, AEON (Sept. 5, 2017), https://aeon.co/ 
essays/the-end-of-a-world-of-nation-states-may-be-upon-us [https://perma.cc/438X-NERM];
Heather K. Gerken & Joshua Revesz, Progressive Federalism: A User’s Guide, DEMOCRACY 
(Spring, No. 44), http://www.democracyjournal.org/magazine/44/progressive-federalism-a-
users-guide/ [https://perma.cc/K7R8-854D].
12. See Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, International Local Government Law, 38 
URB. L. 1, 1–2 (2006); Ileana M. Porras, The City and International Law: In Pursuit of 
Sustainable Development, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 537, 545–49 (2009); Kenneth A. Stahl, 
Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, 2016 BYU L. REV. 177, 179–80; Hiroko
Tabuchi & Henry Fountain, Bucking Trump, These Cities, States and Companies Commit 
to Paris Accord, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/ 
american-cities-climate-standards.html?action=click&contentCollection=Climate&module= 
RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article (describing a petition by local actors to
commit to Paris Accord). 
13. Commentators disagree as to the extent that lopsided Republican majorities in
state legislatures are attributable to political gerrymandering or to geographic sorting. See 
Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography
and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 241 (2013). 
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comfortable majorities in 32 statehouses.14  And over the same years that 
the chorus of voices praising urban political leadership has swelled, state 
legislators with a different set of ideological preferences have begun to 
push back with an unprecedented range of state laws aimed at stripping
away cities’ power.15  Because states enjoy broad authority to preempt local 
laws,16 many cities are increasingly constrained by creative state laws
designed to rein them in.17  For example, the North Carolina “bathroom 
bill” that became the focus of national attention because it required public 
agencies to designate bathroom access based on “biological sex” also
contained a broad provision preempting local wage and hour restrictions.18 
Florida’s legislature considered a ban on any “regulation of matters
relating to commerce, trade, and labor.”19  The Texas legislature spent the
 14. Stephen Wolf, Republicans Now Dominate State Government, With 32 Legislatures 
and 33 Governors, DAILY KOS (Nov. 14, 2016, 10:09 AM), https://www.dailykos.com/ 
stories/2016/11/14/1598918/-Republicans-now-dominate-state-government-with-32-
legislatures-and-33-governors [https://perma.cc/24VU-3N7W]. This Article uses “red” 
and “blue” in their colloquial sense of majority-conservative and majority-liberal, respectively,
even though reality—as always—is far more complicated. See John Sides, Most Americans
Live in Purple America, Not Red or Blue America, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2013), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2013/11/12/most-americans-live-in-
purple-america-not-red-or-blue-america/?utm_term=.fd7e1f87507a [https://perma.cc/K224-
QQDH].  Some have theorized there is a causal connection between the increasing prominence of
rich, liberal cities and the recent success of conservative politics in rural areas and suburbs. 
See Katherine Cramer, How Rural Resentment Helps Explain the Surprising Victory of 
Donald Trump, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/13/how-rural-resentment-helps-explain-the-surprising-victory-of-
donald-trump/?utm_term=.aebbcba2581b [https://perma.cc/72F9-5ZJ6].
15. This is not to say that preemption is a one-sided game.  The California legislature is
considering a bill that would preempt certain local land-use controls that legislators believe
stand in the way of affordable housing construction. See Ben van der Meer, State Senate 
Approves Housing Bills, Including SB 35, SACRAMENTO BUS. J. (June 1, 2017, 11:40
AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/sacramento/news/2017/06/01/state-senate-approves-housing-
bills-including-sb.html [https://perma.cc/ZB5E-VWX4].  However, the geographic concentration
of Democrats in cities—and the fact that Republican-controlled state governments will 
usually have little reason to preempt the policy preferences of Republican-controlled suburbs and
small towns—means punitive preemption is, at the moment, primarily a battle between red
states and blue cities.
 16. See generally GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES
STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2013).
17. See generally NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A
STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS (2018), http://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/NLC-
SML%20Preemption%20Report%202017-pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9BR-XMSF] (detailing 
the increase in preemptive state laws). 
18. H.B. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra Sess., S.L. 2016-3 (N.C. 2016).  House 
Bill 2 was later repealed and replaced with a provision that preempted local regulation of 
access to restrooms and changing facilities.  It also imposed a moratorium on local laws
that regulate “private employment practices.”  H.B. 142, 2017 Gen. Assemb., S.L. 2017-
4 (N.C. 2017).
19.  S.B. 1158, 2017 Leg. Sess. (Fla. 2017). 
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summer of 2017 considering so many preemption bills that one mayor called
it a “war against cities.”20 Many of these laws prevent or would prevent
local governments from taking action on issues that—beyond the fact that
any policy issue is of interest to anybody, anywhere who has an opinion
on the subject—have few, if any, statewide impacts.21  Texas, for example, 
considered a ban on local tree-preservation ordinances,22 while Arizona
considered a ban on local ordinances regulating backyard chickens.23 
The number of preemptive laws is striking in itself.  As one observer 
put it, “The sheer volume of local enactments being ‘preempted’ by state
legislation has reached nearly epidemic proportions.”24  But the wave of
preemptive laws is not merely striking for their quantity: many are also
qualitatively different from their predecessors.  Some are what have been called
“blanket” or “maximum” preemption because their design is to take entire
policy categories off the table for local consideration.25  Other laws,  
which this Article will refer to as “punitive preemption,” impose harsh
penalties on cities that take actions legislators believe contravene state 
laws. The consequences they attach include financial penalties for the 
city, civil or criminal penalties for the policymakers, or even removal from 
office.26  The punitive nature of these laws is particularly striking when 
paired with the open partisan animus displayed by their supporters.  In
Texas, one state official told the Washington Post that his goal was to rein
in cities because they “seem to be sort of the last vanguard of Democratic and
progressive ideals.”27
 20. Philip Jankowski, Austin Mayor: Abbott’s Call for Special Session Is ‘A War 
Against Cities,’ MYSTATESMAN (June 6, 2017, 7:04 PM), http://www.mystatesman.com/
news/state—regional-govt—politics/austin-mayor-abbott-call-for-special-session-war-against- 
cities/40bpFqTSfFo4rFuasW5EIP/ [https://perma.cc/N4KC-CX3U].
21. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 261 (noting that extraterritorial impact is a principle 
undergirding the preemption doctrine). 
 22. Elizabeth Findell, Bill To Ban Tree Ordinances Passes Texas Senate, STATESMAN
(July 27, 2017), http://www.statesman.com/news/state—regional-govt—politics/bill-ban-tree- 
ordinances-passes-texas-senate/x8jEOph56O5qIjO8mymQTP/ [https://perma.cc/4LD4-UQCP]. 
23. See Harmony Huskinson, Arizona Lawmaker Seeks To Bar Cities from Prohibiting
Chickens in Backyards, INSIDE TUCSON BUS. (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.insidetucsonbusiness.
com/news/arizona-lawmaker-seeks-to-bar-cities-from-prohibiting-chickens-in/article319 
695c4-b5de-11e3-ae0a-001a4bcf887a.html [https://perma.cc/MJ7E-8JRD].
24. Stahl, supra note 8, at 134. 
 25. Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local 
Policy Innovation, 47 PUBLIUS 403, 405, 417–18 (2017). 
26. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 66.003(1) (West 2017). 
27. Sandhya Somashekhar, In Austin, the Air Smells of Tacos and Trees–and City-
State Conflict, WASH. POST (July 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-
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The purpose of this Article is to explore whether this new breed of
punitive preemption laws is susceptible to challenge under the free speech 
clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.28  Although the
“big sort” thesis certainly suggests that for many residents, city residence is
a form of political association, this is not an associational argument.  Nor 
is it an argument that states cannot, as a substantive matter, thwart local 
policy preferences through preemption.29  It is, rather, an argument grounded
in the contested nature of preemption30 and the unique contribution that
local lawmaking makes to democratic deliberation.  Specifically, punitive
preemption prevents local lawmakers from passing laws that local majorities 
favor and that they believe are within their authority to pass—foreclosing the
unique form of public debate that precedes passage of a local law—and
from defending the law against state claims of preemption in court.  The 
Supreme Court’s precedents suggest that such prohibitions violate recognized 
First Amendment limits as well as the long-recognized normative principles
undergirding those precedents. 
This is a descriptive argument, based on established Supreme Court
precedents and the normative principles recognized in those precedents. 
It proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief overview of “traditional”
preemption to demonstrate the contribution that local lawmaking makes 
to public debate regarding both the substantive policy matter at issue and
the balance of state-local power.  Part II describes in detail a number of
“punitive preemption” laws that punish the passage of certain kinds of 
local laws to illustrate how punitive preemption forecloses this contribution. 
Part III identifies the ways in which punitive preemption burdens protected 
speech and offers a descriptive account of relevant First Amendment
doctrine—primarily the prohibitions on laws designed to limit public debate, 
on viewpoint discrimination in a public forum, and on laws that insulate 
the government from legal challenge—that offer strong support for a First 
Amendment challenge against punitive preemption. 
austin-the-air-smells-of-tacos-and-trees—and-city-state-conflict/2017/07/01/682eb420-54 
f7-11e7-ba90-f5875b7d1876_story.html?utm_term=.50099d07f7d7 [https://perma.cc/57VU-
XBYW] (quoting Matthew Walter, president of the Republican State Leadership Committee, 
an organization of state elected officials).
28. The First Amendment, of course, protects rights other than free speech. However,
this Article is concerned only with the free speech clause and, unless otherwise noted,
uses “First Amendment” to refer to that clause.
29. A right to local self-government has never been recognized under the U.S.
Constitution. See Barron, supra note 1, at 487 & n.1. 
30. See Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and 
Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (2009) (explaining that state home rule 
doctrines represent a “highly developed, and still developing, case law, one that
involves drawing lines between what is properly the domain of state government and the 
powers which may be exercised by municipalities free of state preemption”).
6
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II. THE PUSH AND PULL OF TRADITIONAL PREEMPTION
A. The Nature of Push-Pull Preemption 
When a city passes a law and the state claims it is preempted, it generally 
takes a trip to the courthouse to reach resolution, and the answer the court
will provide is frequently difficult to predict.31  This is because, even
though the state creature doctrine means a state’s power to preempt is 
often described in expansive terms,32 the legislature’s supremacy is not as
absolute as it is sometimes portrayed.33  Although some states grant cities
only narrow, specifically designed powers,34 the nineteenth-century movement
for “home rule” granted cities in most states broad statutory authority to
pass laws in at least some areas.35  While such “legislative” home rule powers
can still be preempted by statute,36 a significant number of state constitutions
also either expressly or through judicial interpretation recognize meaningful 
boundaries on the state’s power to override local laws under what is called 
“imperio” or “constitutional” home rule.37
 31. See, e.g., Hannah J. Wiseman, Disaggregating Preemption in Energy Law, 40 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 299 (2016) (noting that cases considering similar issues of 
whether local land-use enactments regulating fracking are preempted by state oil and gas
regulation have varied widely in both their reasoning and results). 
32. See, e.g., Richmond, F. & P.R. Co. v. City of Richmond, 133 S.E. 800, 803–04
(1926) (“[Municipal corporations] are mere political subdivisions of the state created for 
the convenient administration of such governmental powers as may be entrusted to them. 
They are creatures of the state, which may grant or withhold such powers as to it shall 
seem meet.  The state may grant these powers in whole or in part, conditionally or 
unconditionally, and may, at its pleasure, modify or withdraw them, with or without the 
consent of the citizens, or even against their protest.  It may, if it chooses, repeal the charter 
and destroy the corporation.”). 
33. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 10, at 1138 (“In most states . . . the legislature is 
free to expressly preempt any local ordinance.”). 
34. This system is often called Dillon’s Rule, named after a nineteenth century jurist
who articulated an extremely cramped conceptualization of municipal powers. See City
of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Missouri River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 464–82 (1868). 
35. See generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
2255, 2285–322 (2003) (describing the history of state home rule laws). 
36. See, e.g., Jarit C. Polley, Uncertainty for the Energy Industry: A Fractured Look at
Home Rule, 34 ENERGY L.J. 261, 262 (2013). 
37. See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 30, at 1338–39 nn.11 & 13 (observing that 
about half the states follow the constitutional model); Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home
Rule: Part 2—Remedying the Urban Disadvantage Through Federalism and Localism, 77 
LA. L. REV. 1045, 1065–77 (2017). 
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Constitutional home rule is, to be sure, a limited doctrine.38  However, 
the dramatic increase in states’ assertion of the powers they can deny local
majorities will likely force state courts to confront novel questions
regarding the state’s power to preempt,39 particularly when preemption
concerns an area of primarily local concern or without identifiable 
extraterritorial impacts.40 In other words, as states pass “maximum”
preemption laws, it will—or should—be up to the courts to determine 
whether they act within their powers under the state constitution in doing so.
Certainly, in many, if not most cases, the answer will be yes.  However, for
purposes of this Article, the important point is that the interplay of statutory 
and home rule provisions means cities and states can legitimately disagree
over whether a local law is—or can constitutionally be—preempted.41 
The result is a push and pull in which a city passes a law, the state claims 
preemption, and the answer is provided by the courts. This push and pull
is perhaps best illustrated by cases involving local fracking laws. In a
typical fracking preemption debate,42 a local government exercises its
statutorily granted powers to regulate the land use aspects of fracking.  The 
state, in turn, claims the local law is preempted by a state oil and gas law
that regulates drilling operations.43  For the court, preemption is a search
for legislative intent, which can be found through either an express
preemption provision, a demonstrated state intent to “occupy the field”
and leave no room for local regulation,44 or an irreconcilable conflict between 
the local ordinance and a state law.45  Thus, courts resolve a preemption
 38. See Diller, supra note 37, at 1050. 
39. See City of Cleveland v. Ohio, 90 N.E. 3d 979, 989 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) 
(holding that a state law preempting certain municipal set-asides on public construction
projects to be “an unconstitutional attempt to eliminate a local authority’s powers of local
self-government in negotiating the terms of public improvement projects” under Ohio’s 
constitution); Briffault, supra note 6, at 261. 
40. See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 30, at 1349 (noting that courts look primarily to
extraterritorial effects and the need for statewide uniformity in determining whether a 
power is “local” under state preemption doctrines).  The fact that certain decisions have 
traditionally been made at the local level can also affect judicial reasoning. See, e.g., 
Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461 (Sup. Ct. 2012)
(reading a preemption provision against the backdrop of the long tradition of local control 
over zoning). 
41. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 254 (“It is striking just how many home rule cases 
our courts consider . . . .”). 
42.  Fracking debates are numerous.  See generally Wiseman, supra note 31. 
43. Id. at 304. 
44. See, e.g., Order Preempting the City’s Ordinance, Ne. Nat. Energy, LLC v. City
of Morgantown, Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, slip op. 6285 (Monongalia 
Cty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (No. 11-C- 411). 
45. See Newbury Twp. Bd. of Trs. v. Lomak Petroleum (Ohio), Inc., 583 N.E.2d 
302, 306 (Ohio 1992); Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 
862–63 (Pa. 2009) (explaining conflict preemption).
8
MAY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2018 10:34 AM     
 












      
 
 
   
 
  









   
 
 
   
 
     
 
 
[VOL. 55:  1, 2018] Punitive Preemption 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
claim through statutory interpretation of the preemption provision—if an 
express provision exists—or an interpretation of what precisely the local 
and state ordinances regulate to find conflict or field preemption.46 
For example, differences in the structure of two local fracking ordinances 
led the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to conclude one was preempted 
by Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act, which regulated the technical features of
oil and gas operations, and one was not.47  The Oil and Gas Act contained an
express provision preempting all local oil and gas development except
with regard to municipal land use ordinances enacted pursuant to a city’s
statutory authority; such laws were only preempted to the extent they either
“contain[ed] provisions which impose[d] conditions, requirements or 
limitations on the same features of oil and gas well operations” regulated 
by the Act, or “accomplish[ed] the same purposes” as set forth in the Act.48 
Two local governments enacted, pursuant to their land use powers,
ordinances regulating fracking. In Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough
Council of the Borough of Oakmont, the town of Oakmont made drilling 
a conditional use, meaning it could only be allowed in a given location
pursuant to a specially granted authorization by the town.49  In Range
Resources Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Township, the township of Salem 
enacted a “comprehensive regulatory scheme” that regulated a number of
technical aspects of fracking beyond its location and land use impacts.50 
The court held that Oakmont’s ordinance could stand, but Salem’s ordinance
must fall. 
To reach this conclusion, the court read the express preemption provision 
in the Oil and Gas Act against the backdrop of the Pennsylvania Municipalities 
Planning Code—the legislative grant of land use powers to cities—and
reasoned that if the legislature granted land use powers to cities, it intended
cities to use those powers unless another state law clearly indicated otherwise, 
which the Oil and Gas Act did not do.51  The court also read the Oil and 
46. See Wiseman, supra note 31, at 317. 
47. Huntley & Huntley, 964 A.2d at 866; Range Resources Appalachia LLC v. 
Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 877 (Pa. 2009). 
48. Huntley & Huntley, 964 A.2d at 858.
 49. Id. at 857–58, 860. 
50. Range Resources, 964 A.2d at 870, 875. 
51. Huntley & Huntley, 964 A.2d at 863, 865–66.  Other courts have recognized
that an express statutory preemption provision must be read against the backdrop of cities’ 
statutorily granted powers—particularly the zoning powers. See, e.g., Anschutz Exploration
Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461, 466 (Sup. Ct. 2012); Cooperstown 
Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 722, 777–79 (Sup. Ct. 2012). 
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Gas Act against a presumption that zoning addresses concerns that are
inherently local and difficult to address on a statewide level.52  Under this
analysis, Oakmont’s ordinance, which made drilling a conditional use, could
stand.53 Salem’s regulatory scheme, on the other hand, went beyond land
use into a number of technical issues and therefore fell under the express
preemption provision.54  A New York trial court reached a similar result 
in Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden.55  The court held that the
legislature had not intended to preempt local land use controls with a state
oil and gas law, which preempted “all local laws or ordinances relating to 
the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining industries,” because local
land use regulations do not “relat[e] to” regulation of oil, gas, and solution 
mining within the meaning of the provision.56 Thus, even an express 
preemption provision does not ensure that a local law in the same policy
area is preempted. 
These cases demonstrate that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, it 
will often be difficult to tell at the outset whether a state’s claim of
preemption will prevail in court.  Of course, the state holds a powerful trump
card.  If a court interprets a state statute as not preempting a local ordinance,
the legislature can simply pass a new one that does. For example, after
Huntley & Huntley established that Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act did
not preempt all municipal fracking regulation,57 the legislature amended 
the Oil and Gas Act by adding comprehensive requirements for technical 
operations, permitting, reporting, and the enforcement of all wells in the
state, and explicitly stripping municipalities of virtually all power to regulate
fracking.58  The legislature’s intent to preempt was abundantly clear. 
However, the legislature’s trump card, while powerful, is not all-powerful.
When Act 13 was challenged by a coalition of municipalities and interest
groups, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck it down, holding that it 
52. Huntley & Huntley, 964 A.2d at 866 (noting that although oil and gas regulation 
is best managed by an expert state environmental agency, local governments have “unique 
expertise” to “designate where different uses should be permitted in a manner that accounts 
for the community’s development objectives, its character, and the ‘suitabilities and special 
nature of particular parts of the community’”). 
53. Id.
 54. Range Resources, 964 A.2d at 877. 
55. Anschutz Exploration Corp., 940 N.Y.S.2d at 461. 
56. Id. at 466–67.  Noting the backdrop of statutory local zoning powers, the court 
pointed to the fact that the express preemption provision at issue did not explicitly mention
zoning, unlike two other state laws that expressly superseded local control over the siting 
of hazardous waste and commercial residential facilities.  Id.  Moreover, those latter statutes 
included provisions to ensure that traditional zoning concerns were taken into account, 
while the state oil and gas law did not even allow the agency granting permits to consider 
such factors. Id. at 467. 
57. Huntley & Huntley, 964 A.2d at 866. 
58.  Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 913 (Pa. 2013). 
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violated an unusual environmental rights provision in the Pennsylvania 
Constitution.59  As more legislatures push their preemptive powers to their 
limits, the constraining powers of state constitutions are likely to come 
into increasingly sharp focus.60 
B. The Value of Push-Pull Preemption to Democratic Deliberation 
At the end of a legal battle over preemption, one of two things will happen.
The law may stand validated, in which case it can be enforced. Alternatively, 
the law may be invalidated, in which case it is unenforceable.  Whether a
law is invalidated or it stands, the push and pull serves important functions 
for our system of democratic self-governance. 
As a starting point, the act of passing the local law communicates a 
uniquely strong commitment to the policy enacted.  It is one thing to advocate 
for a policy in the abstract; it is something else entirely to demonstrate a
willingness to live under such a policy and to take action to make it happen. 
The passage of a gun control law, for example, sends a qualitatively different 
message than does a speech advocating for the passage of gun control laws 
in the abstract.  It sends a particularly powerful message when the local
government passes a law despite triggering a preemption battle with the 
state by doing so.  The battle over preemption of the fracking ordinance in
Denton, Texas, for example, garnered international headlines.61 
The audience for this message is not simply the local electorate.  Cities 
look to each other for policy ideas and inspiration, and local laws influence
the national debate by lending legitimacy to new or contested ideas—such
as support for action on climate change or LGBTQ rights.62  Local lawmaking 
also influences the public debate because cities are “laboratories of 
democracy”63 where new ideas, or variations on similar ideas, can be road-
59. Id. at 979, 983–84. 
60. See, e.g., City of Austin’s Opposed Motion to Intervene at 16–17, City of San
Antonio v. Texas, No. 5:17-cv-00489 (W.D. Tex. June 1, 2017) (arguing that a Texas anti-
sanctuary cities law violates home rule provisions of the Texas Constitution). 
61. See Malewitz, supra note 7 (noting that the city–state battle over fracking preemption
made “international headlines”).
62. See Claire Cain Miller, Liberals Turn to Cities To Pass Laws and Spread Ideas,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/upshot/liberals-turn-
to-cities-to-pass-laws-and-spread-ideas.html?mcubz=0&_r=0.
63. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Justice Brandeis was referring to states, but the principle that democracy is enhanced when 
different ideas are developed and tested at a smaller scale applies as well, if not better, to 
cities.
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tested and refined.64  This is particularly true because local lawmaking presents 
heightened opportunities for citizen participation.  Without romanticizing
local lawmaking, which can be dominated by elites or otherwise can be 
less than fully inclusive, it does frequently offer citizens direct opportunities
to participate in policymaking, such as task force involvement in drafting 
ordinances,65 direct citizen dialogue,66 formal roles for civic associations,67 
and public hearings.68  Local lawmaking thus allows citizens a unique role
in advocating and shaping homegrown policies that, in turn, can shape state
and national debates. 
In addition to influencing the national debate on a substantive policy 
area, the push and pull of preemption challenges serve an entirely different
function of shaping the balance of state-local power.  When a city passes a 
law, it communicates a belief that the city has the authority to pass that law.
If a preemption challenge ensues and the city wins, the city has protected
its ability to exercise the powers granted to it by the state’s constitution and 
laws to their fullest extent. This result serves important principles of separation 
of powers by ensuring it is the judiciary, and not the state legislature or 
executive branch, that provides binding interpretations of the laws and the 
state constitution. In addition, the preemption challenge itself also serves 
an important communicative function.69 Even if the city’s challenge fails, 
the passage of the law and the fight to defend it communicates a strong
belief that the city should have the claimed power—a message with the 
potential to influence statewide voters, who ultimately control the balance 
of state-local power through their legislators. 
“Regular” non-punitive preemption allows this push and pull to take 
place: the consequences for a city that passes a preempted law are legal
 64. See Riverstone-Newell, supra note 25, at 418–19. 
65. See Jody Spear, Maine Voices: Portland Task Force’s Pesticide Ordinance Is
Full Of Loopholes, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (July 18, 2017), http://www.pressherald.
com/2017/07/18/maine-voices-portland-task-force-pesticide-ordinance-is-full-of-loopholes/
[https://perma.cc/FUS9-WLSK]. 
66. See Doug Gross, Peachtree Corners Passes New Gun Ordinance, PEACHTREE
CORNERS PATCH (Nov. 16, 2016, 2:15 PM), https://patch.com/georgia/peachtreecorners/ 
peachtree-corners-passes-new-gun-ordinance [https://perma.cc/5LM2-W33L].
67. See Katherine Gregor, VMU: Coming Soon Near You, AUSTIN CHRON. (Mar. 
23, 2007), https://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2007-03-23/458471/ [https://perma.cc/
H49L-5WCC].
68. INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL GOV’T, GETTING THE MOST OUT OF PUBLIC HEARINGS: AN 
IDEAS INVENTORY 2 (2005), http://www.ca-ilg.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/resources__
getting_the_most_3__11-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BBH-SQZA]. 
69. See infra pp. 43–45 (discussing First Amendment protections for challenges to 
state laws). 
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bills and an invalid ordinance.70  The purpose of punitive preemption laws 
is to foreclose the legal battle by preventing the lawmaking process from 
happening in the first place through imposing weighty consequences on 
cities that test the boundaries of preemption and lose.  The next section
describes the means by which these laws do so. 
III. EXAMPLES OF PUNITIVE PREEMPTION
Preemption has long been a feature of our legal landscape, and preemptive
laws have long been structured as a prohibition on local lawmaking. In
Romer v. Evans, for example, the Supreme Court struck down, on equal 
protection grounds, a state constitutional amendment that provided that no 
unit of Colorado government shall “enact, adopt, or enforce” any local
anti-discrimination laws protecting LGBTQ persons.71  However, the
consequences of a city passing a law that turns out, after challenge, to be 
preempted are typically nothing more than that the law cannot be enforced, 
and that the city lost whatever expenses it incurred unsuccessfully trying 
to defend it.72  Punitive preemption, on the other hand, attaches harsh 
consequences to passing laws, endorsing policies, or even violating the 
undefined “spirit” of a state law.  Thus, local officials considering enacting a
policy or law that may be preempted do not merely face the prospect of a 
court challenge; they face the potential for fines, civil liability, criminal
sanction, and other penalties as creative as they are severe, enacted precisely 
to prevent local governments from passing laws or enacting policies that
are, or may be, preempted in the first place.
A. Removal from Office 
Texas offers perhaps the most straightforward example of punitive
preemption that directly limits speech through a prohibition on “adopt[ing], 
enforce[ing], or endors[ing]” a sanctuary cities policy, sanctionable by— 
among other potential penalties—removal of an elected official from office
for making the prohibited endorsement.73  The First Amendment implications
of the prohibition on “endorsement” are clear: indeed, the Fifth Circuit
 70. See, e.g., City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 579, 583, 
585 (Colo. 2016) (en banc) (affirming an injunction barring the enforcement of a local 
fracking ban). 
71. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (quoting COLO. CONST. art II, § 30b). 
72. See, e.g., Webb v. City of Black Hawk, 295 P.3d 480, 486 (Colo. 2013). 
73.  S.B. 4, Tex. Leg. Sess. 85(R) (codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE § 752.053(a)(1)). 
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affirmed a district court’s injunction of the endorsement provision on First 
Amendment grounds.74  Separate from the “endorsement” issue, however,
the threat of removal from office for taking an action the state considers
preempted is a punitive provision that could be attached to any number of 
policies or laws.
Senate Bill 4 (S.B. 4), the sanctuary cities bill, was passed in a show of
political theater that has become a regular occurrence in strongly Republican-
dominated Texas,75 and is an apt metaphor for city-state relations in many
areas of the country.  An estimated 1,000 shouting protestors packed the 
pink dome of the Capitol, others occupied the governor’s office, and one 
particularly creative group blared mariachi music outside the governor’s 
mansion at 3 a.m.76  Elected officials played their part with aggressive
shoving and alleged death threats on the House floor.77  When the curtain 
fell, the legislature had passed a bill intended to foreclose any Texas city from 
implementing a sanctuary cities policy.78 
A “sanctuary” city is generally understood to be one that limits its cooperation
with requests by the federal immigration officials to hold persons while 
the federal officials inquire into the detainee’s immigration status.79  For
example, Travis County—the territory of which is largely taken up by the 
City of Austin and its suburbs—announced its policy was to only comply
with civil detainer requests when supported by a warrant or backed by
74. City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 185 (5th Cir. 2018); Order Granting 
Preliminary Injunction at 44, 93–94, City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 30, 2017) (No. SA-17-cv-404). 
75. See Aman Batheja, Texas’ Shift from Blue to Red Informs 2014 Races, TEX.
TRIB. (June 6, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2014/06/06/how-texas-
shifted-blue-red-informs-democrats-today/ [https://perma.cc/B5JU-2QAR] (describing
Republican dominance in the legislature, congressional delegation, and the holding of 
every statewide office since 1998).  Progressive political theater is perhaps best embodied 
by the eleven-hour filibuster by state legislator Wendy Davis that delayed a controversial
set of restrictions on abortion providers. See Manny Fernandez, In Texas, A Senator’s
Stand Catches the Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
06/27/us/politics/texas-abortion-bill.html?mcubz=0.
76.  Gus Bova, What You Need To Know About the SB 4 Legal Battle, TEX. OBSERVER
(June 19, 2017, 2:02 PM), https://www.texasobserver.org/need-know-sb-4-legal-battle/ 
[https://perma.cc/LT5E-3F8W].
77. See Peter W. Stevenson, A Texas Republican Is Accused of Threatening to ‘Put 




 79. Tal Kopan, What Are Sanctuary Cities, and Can They Be Defunded, CNN POL. 
(Jan. 25, 2017, 5:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/sanctuary-cities-explained/
index.html [https://perma.cc/7Q4S-F5NC].
14
MAY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2018 10:34 AM     
 






















      
 




     
   
[VOL. 55:  1, 2018] Punitive Preemption 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
probable cause.80  An important point is that sanctuary cities policies are 
often a form of inaction—a failure to enforce federal laws that does not 
necessarily require an affirmative act of local lawmaking.81  Thus, anti-
sanctuary cities laws are not always technically preemption, although they
are closely analogous.
Under S.B. 4, a “local entity” or campus police department is forbidden
to “adopt, enforce, or endorse a policy” that “prohibits or materially limits 
the enforcement of immigration laws,” that demonstrates by a pattern or
practice that immigration laws are not being enforced, or that interferes
with an officer’s cooperation with immigration agents.82  Any citizen residing 
in that entity’s jurisdiction may file a complaint with the Texas Attorney
General alleging the city is out of compliance, at which point the Attorney
General may petition the district court for a writ of mandamus compelling 
the local entity to comply.83 
S.B. 4 includes a range of enforcement mechanisms. Entities found to 
be in violation face civil penalties of up to $1,500 per day for the first violation 
and $25,000 per day for subsequent violations.84  A sheriff, chief of police, 
or other person with “primary authority for administering a jail” commits 
a misdemeanor involving official misconduct if that person refuses to
comply with a detainer request.85  And an elected official may be removed from
office for “violat[ing] Section 752.053”—the section of S.B. 4 prohibiting 
the “adopt[ion], enforce[ment], or endorse[ment]” of a sanctuary cities policy.86 
The question that immediately arises from the removal penalty is where
the state found the authority to remove a local official from office at all. 
The Texas Constitution authorizes cities with a population greater than
5,000 to adopt a charter that, among other things, defines how elected
officials are elected or removed from office.87  However, the removal provision 
makes use of the quo warranto provision of Texas law.  Quo warranto 
stems from an ancient English writ that allowed a person to challenge the 
80. See, e.g., City of Austin’s Complaint in Intervention at 4, City of San Antonio
v. Texas, No. 5:17-cv-00489 (W.D. Tex. June 2, 2017). 
81. See Kopan, supra note 79. 
82.  S.B. 4, Tex. Leg. Sess. 85(R) (codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE § 752.053(a)–(b)). 
83. Id.
 84. Id.
 85. TEX. PENAL CODE § 39.07 (2017). 
86. S.B. 4, Tex. Leg. Sess. 85(R) (codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 752.053(a)(1),
752.0565).
87. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
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validity of an official’s claim of office.88  In its current form, it offers
a procedure for the state to remove from office any “public officer” who 
unlawfully holds an office or “does an act or allows an act that by law causes
a forfeiture of his office.”89  S.B. 4, in turn, provides that noncompliance with
section 752.053 is such an act.90  The result is that the Attorney General, or a
county or district attorney, may now file a proceeding in state court seeking 
removal of officials for endorsing sanctuary cities policies.91  An official 
so removed “shall” pay the cost of prosecution, and may also face fines.92 
In granting a preliminary injunction against S.B. 4, the district court
focused on the argument that a policy prohibiting “endorse[ment]” is facially 
invalid under the First Amendment as a restriction on the officials’ speech93 
and did not consider the propriety of this use of the quo warranto provisions
of state law. If enacting a policy with which state legislators disagree may
permissibly be defined as official misconduct for which the quo warranto 
remedy is available, the results could be significant.  For example, the
state could conceivably declare the adoption of a policy premised on
a belief that human activity is causing the climate to change to be a
removable offense.  The implications are also not limited to Texas because
most states have some form of official misconduct statute.  As discussed
below, Kentucky legislators used an official misconduct statute to punish
the passage of gun-related laws.94  While many such laws appear written 
to address corruption or bribery, the language is often broad,95 and in any
case, nothing prevents the legislature from amending their misconduct 
88. JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES EMBRACING 
MANDAMUS, QUO WARRANTO, AND PROHIBITION 545 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 3d ed. 
1896) (describing the history of the writ, which dates back to at least 1198). 
89. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 66.001 (West 2008).  Older Texas cases
stand for the proposition that quo warranto “is employed only to test the actual right to an 
office or franchise . . . and cannot be used to test the legality of the official action of public 
or corporate officers.”  State v. Rigsby, 43 S.W. 271, 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).  However, 
the current statute, last amended in 1985, appears to have a broader reach. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. § 66.001. 
90. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 752.0565(a) (West 2017) (“For purposes of Section
66.001 . . . a person holding an elective or appointive office of a political subdivision of
this state does an act that causes the forfeiture of the person’s office if the person violates
Section 752.053.”). 
91. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 66.003(1) (West 2008). 
92. Id. § 66.003(2)–(3). 
93. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 74, at 33–48.  The court held 
the law both overbroad and void for vagueness. Id. 
94. See infra Section III(C). 
95. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.ANN. § 11.56.850 (West 2017) (explaining that acts constitute 
official misconduct only if undertaken “with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or deprive
another person of a benefit”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-5-107 (West 2017) (explaining that public
offenses justifying removal must be committed “with intent to obtain a pecuniary benefit 
or maliciously to cause harm to another”).
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statutes to remove such limitations.  The threat of removal from office for
taking action that conflicts with state law therefore provides a strong
disincentive to pass laws testing the boundaries of the city’s authority. 
B. Cutting Off Funding 
If a city ordinance tests the boundaries of a preemptive state law, is the 
ordinance an illegitimate attempt to exploit a loophole or a legitimate
effort to use the full range of a city’s non-preempted powers?  In Arizona, 
the legislature determined it was the former96 and passed a sweeping law
that cuts off the city’s funding upon a determination by the Attorney General 
that a city ordinance violates state law or the Arizona constitution. 
The law, S.B. 1487,97 allows any legislator to request an Attorney General
investigation into whether “any ordinance, regulation, order or other official
action adopted or taken by the governing body” of a local government violates 
state law or the Arizona Constitution.98  Upon receiving such request, the
Attorney General has thirty days to investigate the local action and, if the
Attorney General concludes the action violates state law or the Constitution, 
requires the treasurer to withhold the city’s share of state funds until the 
law is repealed and redistribute the funds to other cities.99  In other words, 
S.B. 1487 grants the Attorney General the unilateral power to impose drastic 
penalties on local governments based on the Attorney General’s own view 
that the law is preempted.100 The Attorney General may also conclude the
local action “may violate” a provision of state law, in which case it may initiate 
an expedited special proceeding in the state Supreme Court.101  If it does 
so, the local government is required to post a bond equal to the amount of 
state-collected revenue distributed to it over the last six months.102 
An Attorney General finding that a local ordinance violates state law 
has significant financial consequences.  For example, after the Attorney
 96. Tim Steller, Steller: City-State Debates Always Return to Gun Issue, ARIZ.
DAILY STAR (Dec. 13, 2016), http://tucson.com/news/local/columnists/steller/steller-city-
state-debates-always-return-to-gun-issue/article_1d213890-1e5e-5be5-84c6-8a1ec575fc4a.
html [https://perma.cc/2FYN-CE9W].
97. S.B. 1487, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 41-194.01 (West 2016)). 
98. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01(A). 
99. Id. § 41-194.01(B)(1). 
100. The law therefore appears to present significant separation of powers concerns. 
101. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-194.01(B)(2), 42-5029(L). 
102. Id. § 41-194.01(B)(2).
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General concluded that the City of Bisbee’s ban on plastic bags violated
state law, the City repealed the ordinance rather than lose $2 million in state-
collected revenue—a quarter of the city’s annual budget.103  The bond 
requirement under a “may violate” scenario also provides a significant
disincentive to defending an ordinance in court.  Tucson, for example, had
to post a $57 million bond to challenge the Attorney General’s finding 
that its policy of destroying confiscated guns “may violate” state law.104  The
law therefore provides an enormous disincentive to passing any laws that
could be interpreted as preempted.
More ominously, S.B. 1487 covers any “official action” taken by a
governing body105 and leaves the term undefined; the law therefore applies
to more than just the passage of a law, and would appear to cover the 
passage of symbolic resolutions106 or actions related to the city’s internal
operations.107  For example, if the state decided to prohibit local climate 
action, a local commitment to purchase renewable energy could be impossible
under S.B. 1487.108  In other words, S.B. 1487 could be applied in ways directly
analogous to S.B. 4’s prohibition on the “endorse[ment]” of a policy.
The reach of the law is enormous and growing.  In the same session in 
which S.B. 1487 was passed, the Arizona legislature vastly expanded the 
universe of state laws with which a local enactment could conflict, passing
 103. Dustin Gardiner, Bisbee Repealing Plastic-Bag Ban To Dodge State Bullet, REPUBLIC, 
(Oct. 31, 2017, 6:26 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2017/10/
31/bisbee-plastic-bag-ordinance-repeal-attorney-general-mark-brnovich-ruling/819584001/ 
[https://perma.cc/P7NA-HJN7].
104. See Elvia Diaz, Tucson’s Gun Fight Isn’t About Guns, AZCENTRAL (Dec. 15,
2016), https://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/op-ed/elviadiaz/2016/12/15/tucson-gun-
fight-republicans/95441600/ [https://perma.cc/8L8F-CXY9].
105. S.B. 1487, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 41-194.01(A) (West 2016)). 
106. See, e.g., City Council Passes Resolution Opposing Cuts to Federal Arts Funding, 
CITY MINNEAPOLIS NEWS (Apr. 28, 2017), http://news.minneapolismn.gov/2017/04/28/city-
council-passes-resolution-opposing-cuts-federal-arts-funding/ [https://perma.cc/WH57-9ZWE].
107. As a practical matter, the law also turns the state attorney general into a new 
zoning board of appeal.  The first request for an attorney general investigation was brought 
by a legislator on behalf of residents aggrieved by the Town of Snowflake’s decision to
grant a special use permit to a marijuana greenhouse, which the legislator claimed violated
various procedural requirements and the prohibition on contract zoning.  See MARK BRNOVICH, 
STATE OF ARIZ. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT NO. 16-001, 
RE: SNOWFLAKE TOWN COUNCIL’S APPROVAL OF A SPECIAL USE PERMIT AND MEDICAL
MARIJUANA CULTIVATION FACILITIES AGREEMENT FOR COPPERSTATE FARMS, LLC (2016), 
https://www.azag.gov/complaints/sb1487-investigations/pending-sb1487-investigations 
[https://perma.cc/79V5-LGQ8].
108. See Hundreds of U.S. Mayors Endorse Switch to 100% Renewable Energy by
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bills preempting local regulation of dog breeders, short-term rentals, plastic
bags, and more.109 It considered but rejected others, including proposed bans
on sanctuary city policies and backyard chicken regulations.110  It also 
passed S.B. 1524, which provides that unless specifically authorized, a local
government, county, or agency may not “take any action that increases the 
regulatory burdens on a person unless there is a critical or urgent need that 
has not been addressed by legislation or self-regulation within the proposed
regulated field.”111  What constitutes a “critical or urgent need” is undefined.
Although the express focus of S.B. 1524 is “sharing economy” companies 
such as Airbnb,112 the law is broadly worded to apply to the regulatory burdens 
on any “person.”  Thus, the combination of broad preemption laws and S.B. 
1487 erects significant practical barriers to a wide range of local enactments
that “may violate” a state law.
C. Criminalizing Lawmaking 
While S.B. 1487 targets the municipal corporation, other punitive preemption
provisions target the lawmakers themselves.  At least two states have passed 
laws that actually criminalize the passage of preempted local laws.  In 2012, 
the Kentucky legislature adopted, as part of a package of gun-friendly bills, a
law aimed at ensuring no local government steps in to fill any remaining 
gaps.113  H.B. 500114 provides that no local government “or any person acting
under [its] authority . . . may occupy any part of the field of regulation of 
the manufacture, sale, purchase, taxation, transfer, ownership, possession, 
carrying, storage, or transportation of firearms, ammunition, components 
of firearms, components of ammunition, firearms accessories, or combination 
thereof.”115  It declares any such “law, regulation, or policy” null and void 
109. See Alia Beard Rau, Legislature Keeps Its Thumb on Arizona Cities, REPUBLIC
(May 9, 2016, 5:01 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/legislature/2016/05/09/
legislature-keeps-its-thumb-arizona-cities/83842924/ [https://perma.cc/G8LB-UEEK].
110. Id.
111.  S.B. 1524, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016). 
112. Id.; see also Steven Totten, Governor Ducey Signs Airbnb Bill, Other Sharing
Economy Bills, PHX. BUS. J. (May 12, 2016, 1:57 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/
phoenix/blog/business/2016/05/governor-ducey-signs-airbnb-bill-other-sharing.html [https://
perma.cc/89BV-FKSQ] (describing S.B. 1524 as targeting companies such as Airbnb). 
113. Kentucky Governor Signs Three NRA-Backed Bills into Law, NRA INST. FOR
LEGIS. ACTION (Apr. 12, 2012), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20120412/kentucky-governor-
signs-three-nra-backed-bills-into-law [https://perma.cc/A3CN-FXLA].
114. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.870 (West 2012). 
115. Id. § 65.870(1). 
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and requires the immediate repeal of any laws, regulations, or policy in
violation.116 
Among the punitive enforcement provisions117 is one that makes it a form
of “official misconduct” for a “public servant” to “violat[e] this section.”118 
Official misconduct in Kentucky is a criminal misdemeanor punishable 
by jail time of up to twelve months.119  The law is highly vague:  how, precisely,
does “any person” “occupy any part of the field” of firearms regulation?120 
By voting on a gun ordinance?  By serving in a city that has failed to repeal 
one?  By attending in an official capacity a mayors’ conference on combatting 
gun violence?  The chilling potential of Kentucky’s law is extreme.
Arizona, however, took the concept a step farther by making it a felony
to pass a smart gun law.121  The source of this high degree of legislative concern
is unclear. The express inspiration for the 2017 bill was a 2002 New Jersey
law requiring all guns sold in the state to employ “smart” technology.122  In
the ensuing fifteen years, no local government in Arizona passed any similar
ordinance. But if they get tempted to try, H.B. 2216123 now provides it is
unlawful to “require a person to use or be subject to electronic firearm 
tracking technology or to disclose any identifiable information about the 
person or the person’s firearm for the purpose of using electronic firearm 
tracking technology.”124  Local officials who “require” anyone to do so face
 116. Id. § 65.870(2)–(3). 
117.  For a discussion of its citizen suit provision, see infra Section III(D). 
118. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.870(6) (“A violation of this section by a public 
servant shall be a violation of either KRS 522.020 or 522.030.”).  Section 522.020 governs 
first-degree official misconduct: “(1) A public servant is guilty of official misconduct in
the first degree when, with intent to obtain or confer a benefit or to injure another person 
or to deprive another person of a benefit, he knowingly: (a) Commits an act relating to his 
office which constitutes an unauthorized exercise of his official functions; or (b) Refrains 
from performing a duty imposed upon him by law or clearly inherent in the nature of his 
office; or (c) Violates any statute or lawfully adopted rule or regulation relating to his
office. (2) Official misconduct in the first degree is a Class A misdemeanor.”  Id. §
522.020.  Section 533.030 governs second-degree official misconduct, which is when the 
official acts in violation of Section 1(a)–(c) without the intent to obtain a benefit or injure
another. Id. §§ 522.030, 522.010.  Second-degree misconduct still carries the threat of jail
time up to ninety days.  Id. § 532.090(1)–(2). 
119. Id. §§ 522.020(2), 532.090(1)–(2). 
120. Id. § 65.870(1). 
121. Smart guns typically employ fingerprint recognition or radio frequency
identification triggered by a ring or bracelet to render the gun operable only by its owner. 
See SENATE RESEARCH, ARIZ. STATE SENATE, AMENDED FACT SHEET FOR H.B. 2216, at 1– 
2 (2017), https://apps.azleg.gov/BillStatus/GetDocumentPdf/452284 [https://perma.cc/ 
4TBL-XADD].
122. Id. 
123. H.B. 2216, 53d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3122 (2017)). 
124. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3122(A). 
20
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a minimum of one year and maximum of nearly four years’ imprisonment, 
and a fine of up to $150,000.125 
D. Enhanced Citizen Suit Provisions 
Several other states have taken the approach of facilitating private 
preemption suits against local governments, and making it more difficult 
for cities to defend themselves.126  Florida, for example, enforces its intent 
to “occupy[] the whole field of regulation of firearms and ammunition”127 
with a powerful citizen suit provision aimed at local officials.  Florida’s section 
790.33128 authorizes any citizen or organization “adversely affected”129 by
a local enactment to bring suit against the local government.  It further prohibits
the local government from using public funds to “defend or reimburse the 
unlawful conduct of any person found to have knowingly and willfully
violated” the section.130  The law therefore presents the puzzle of how the
local government will determine whether it can participate in its official’s 
legal defense prior to the official being adjudged a willful violator. A 
finding of a “knowing and willful” violation subjects the responsible
elected officials to civil fines of up to $5,000 and possible removal from 
office by the governor.131  Consequences for the municipality are also significant. 
Section 790.33(f) provides that a court “shall” award attorney’s fees and 
costs and actual damages up to $100,000 to the “prevailing plaintiff.”132 
This means individuals or nonprofits can bring suits with few consequences: 
if they win, they receive costs; if they lose, they don’t have to pay the city’s 
costs.133 
Kentucky’s section 65.870, discussed above, contains a similar provision 
to Florida’s citizen suit provision—indeed, much of the language is identical.134
 125. Id. §§ 13-703(H)–(J), 13-801(A). 
126. See, e.g., OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.24(D) (West 2015) (creating civil liability
for violating a firearms preemption provision). 
127. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.33(1) (West 2015). 
128. Id. § 790.33. 
129. Id. § 790.33(3)(f). 
130. Id. § 790.33(3)(d). 
131. Id. § 790.33(3)(c). 
132. Id. § 790.33(3)(f)(1)–(2). 
133. In contrast, Kentucky’s law provides for costs, but not damages, for the “prevailing
party.”  KY. REV. STAT. § 65.870(4)–(5) (2017). 
134. The similar wording of preemptive laws is likely attributable to advocacy
organizations such as the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which provide 
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It creates a private cause of action for any person or organization “adversely
affected by any ordinance, administrative regulation, executive order, policy,
procedure, rule, or any other form of executive or legislative action” promulgated
or enforced “in violation of this section or the spirit thereof.”135  The law also
strips government employees of any immunity.136  When a local government 
faces potential liability for violating the letter—or, in Kentucky’s case, the 
undefined “spirit” of a state law—the chilling potential for local lawmaking 
is extreme.
E. The Effects of Punitive Preemption 
This section demonstrates that punitive preemption laws often reach 
undeniably expressive conduct—the endorsement of a policy under S.B.
4, or an expressive “official action” under S.B. 1487, such as a symbolic
resolution or official speech.137  The First Amendment implications are clear
for state laws that target what could very imperfectly be called “purely
expressive” activities that express support for a particular policy without
substantive legal effect.
But these punitive preemption laws also burden lawmaking.  Lawmaking, 
as an act of governing with substantive legal effect, less obviously merits 
First Amendment protections.  At the same time, and as discussed above,
local lawmaking serves unique communicative and deliberative functions 
related to both the substantive policy and the balance of state-local power 
through the unique public debate that inevitably precedes a law’s passage
and through the substantive act of passing the law and then defending it
against preemption challenge. The following Part argues that a number of 
recognized strands of free speech doctrine suggest viable First Amendment
challenges to punitive preemption laws. 
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PUNITIVE PREEMPTION
When a state law prohibits a person from “endorsing” a policy, as did
Texas’ S.B. 4, the intuition is immediate that the First Amendment is
implicated.  An official’s “endorsement” of a policy can come in many forms, 
from public speeches to dinner-party conversation, and the Court has been
model state laws. See Rau, supra note 109 (noting the prevalence of ALEC model legislation
in the Arizona legislature). 
135. KY. REV. STAT. § 65.870(4). 
136. Id. 
137. As noted above, “preemption” is not always the perfect term for such laws, as 
the action being forbidden is not lawmaking; however, this Article uses it as admittedly
imprecise shorthand because of its close parallels to preemption and because some provisions,
such as S.B. 1487, would also have a preemptive effect when applied to lawmaking.
22
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clear that “statements by public officials on matters of public concern
must be accorded First Amendment protection.”138 
It is less intuitive that the lawmaking process could also implicate the 
First Amendment.  After all, there exists no clear case law standing for
the premise that passing a law is protected speech, and one Supreme Court 
case held, in the context of a challenge to a state conflict-of-interest law,
that a legislator has no personal expressive interest in the act of voting.139 
However, the passage of a law involves a lot of different speakers and speech 
that may be burdened by limitations on local lawmaking.  Such limitations 
affect numerous kinds of speech by the elected officials who draft, discuss, 
and ultimately vote on local laws.  They affect the citizens who put local
officials in office to enact policies they favor and who express their
enthusiasm or opposition for those policies during the lawmaking process. 
Passing a law may also be a step in bringing a legal challenge, arguing 
that the local law is not validly preempted.  Thus, lawmaking is about far 
more than the personal expressive functions that voting may serve for a 
lawmaker; it implicates a broad swath of political speech that arises only 
in the context of lawmaking.
However, it is also important to note that different First Amendment 
arguments apply to laws burdening what can imperfectly be called “pure 
expression,” such as S.B. 4’s “endorse[ment]” provision, and those burdening 
lawmaking.  Section A of this Part considers the First Amendment arguments
against laws restricting local officials’ expression that has no direct legal
effect, such as a speech advocating sanctuary cities policies.140  The aim
of this Section is to reject arguments that a state may restrict local officials’
speech by virtue of the legal relationship between local governments and
the government of the state in which they lie. 
Section B considers arguments for First Amendment protection for the
passage of laws that might be preempted.  In referring to laws that are 
“possibly” or “might be” preempted, the Article intends to capture the fact
that a city that passes a law typically has a good-faith argument that the 
local law is not preempted.  While it is also possible to conceive of a category 
138.  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
139. See Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 127–29 (2001). 
140. Somewhere in between “pure” expression and lawmaking is communication 
with the goal of effectuating an unofficial policy. For example, if a sheriff informally tells
an employee not to comply with federal detainer requests, this is neither lawmaking nor “pure”
expression.  However, a prohibition on “endorsing” a policy would cover “pure” expression, such as
the pro-sanctuary-cities speech, and it is this aspect of the law that will be discussed.
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of “protest” laws—laws passed without a good-faith belief in their viability, 
purely for the political or expressive value of doing so141—such laws are 
not the primary focus of this Article.  Section B begins by identifying the
speech implicated by restrictions on lawmaking, and then explores specific 
First Amendment doctrines supporting an argument that such restrictions 
burden that speech. 
The argument that local lawmaking can enjoy First Amendment protections
against punitive preemption is not an argument that states cannot, as a 
substantive matter, preempt local laws.  This Article accepts that if a state 
law validly preempts a local law, the local law has no effect and cannot
be enforced.142  However, the question of whether a preempted local law
can be enforced—it cannot—is a different question from whether states 
can burden the passage of laws that may turn out to be preempted and 
unenforceable. This Article offers a number of arguments from existing First
Amendment for why a state cannot do so.
A. State Regulation of Local Officials’ Speech 
The proposition is straightforward that a law like Texas’ S.B. 4, which 
imposes penalties on the “endorse[ment]” of a policy with which the state 
disagrees, burdens speech based on viewpoint.  The Supreme Court considers
viewpoint discrimination an “egregious” form of content discrimination, 
and has warned that “[t]he government must abstain from regulating speech
when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the 
speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”143  On the other hand, scholars
have noted that many permissible laws, such as securities disclosure requirements
or prohibitions on cigarette advertising, limit speech based on the viewpoint 
141. Stahl, supra note 8, at 150 (“Democratic city officials may enact legislation they
know will be preempted in order to demonstrate their commitment to progressive causes.”).
142.  It is possible to conceive of an argument to the contrary grounded in representational 
rights, perhaps flowing from the demonstrated tendency of people to move to cities where
they can be surrounded by people who can share their ideological preferences.  However, 
such an argument faces significant challenges.  Thus, the fact that a minority of voters in
a state want a certain policy and are not able to implement it is not necessarily a problem,
even if that minority all lives together in a certain place.  To the contrary, one can easily argue
that this is democracy working as it should, unless equal protection or other constitutional 
guarantees are implicated. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645–48 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (noting that statewide minority is not burdened by inability to use their “geographic
concentration” to pass policies they prefer at the local level).
143. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(“Viewpoint discrimination is . . . an egregious form of content discrimination.”); see also
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (invalidating a hate-speech ordinance
as viewpoint discrimination). 
24
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expressed.144 Moreover, when the government is involved in facilitating 
the speech, such as through subsidizing the speech of private individuals 
or when a government employee speaks in her official capacity, the Court 
has recognized that the government can decide what message it wants to 
convey.145  The question presented by laws such as S.B. 4, then, is whether 
these or other doctrines enable the state to permissibly limit local officials’ 
speech.
1. Imminent Lawless Action 
In justifying punitive preemption, states often argue they are simply trying 
to prevent local officials from breaking the law.146  As to a sanctuary cities 
policy, the state may claim that the policy is aimed at ensuring compliance
with federal immigration law, although as a practical matter, such policies 
are often designed to technically comply with federal immigration law.147 
A broader version of the argument is that because state laws trump local
laws, preempted local laws are literally illegal, and therefore punitive preemption
presents no problem because it is merely demanding local officials to follow
state law, just like everybody else does.148  It certainly cannot be the answer
to a First Amendment inquiry that a state has made a category of speech
illegal and therefore the restriction on speech is simply restricting illegal
activity—if that were the case, the free speech guarantee would be meaningless. 
However, the First Amendment does recognize the need to restrict speech
with the likely effect of producing imminent lawlessness.149
 144. See Cass R. Sunstein, Half-Truths of the First Amendment, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 25, 27–29. 
145. See generally Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government 
Speech When the Government Has Nothing To Say, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259 (2010) (exploring
the government speech doctrine).
146. See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 74, at 38. According to
the Order, the author of S.B. 4 responded to a question about the free speech implications
of the bill with the statement, “I don’t know that that’s a free speech issue if you’ve been
elected to uphold the law.  You don’t get the right as a free speech to go out and not uphold 
the law.”  Id.
 147. See, e.g., City of Austin’s Opposed Motion to Intervene, supra note 60, at 13 
(arguing Austin complies with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and therefore is not a sanctuary city under
federal law).
148. See Rau, supra note 109.  Rau’s article quotes an advocate of Arizona’s S.B. 
1487 as saying “If you knowingly violate state law, why should you get a pass? . . . Local 
jurisdictions are subdivisions of the state; they are violating the law.” Id.
 149. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (“[T]he constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
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This narrow exception cannot be stretched to cover endorsement of a
policy. “Imminent lawless action” refers to “violence” or “disorder,”150 and 
it is difficult to conceive of a local policy that would incite imminent disorder.
While a state could conceivably argue that a sanctuary city policy undermines
public safety, this is still a far cry from the paradigm of violence in the streets. 
The state may argue it is more “likely”151 that lawless action will follow from
the endorsement when the speaker is an elected official, but this doesn’t 
change the fact that the lawlessness at issue is not imminent violence.
2. Defining and Enforcing Qualifications of Service 
A more colorable variation on the “lawlessness” argument is that the 
state has an interest in ensuring local officials, as a qualification of service,
are law-abiding citizens who respect and uphold the Constitution and laws 
of the state, and it can therefore punish those who fail to do so.152  While
this proposition, writ large, is uncontroversial, it cannot apply in a blanket 
fashion to a law that simply recasts a restriction on speech restrictions as
a form of official misconduct.  The Court has made clear that public officials 
do not surrender their free speech rights as a condition of service.153 
Indeed, the Court rejected a closely analogous argument in the civil
rights case Bond v. Floyd.154 Julian Bond was a civil rights activist elected 
to the Georgia House of Representatives in 1965.155  In his prior work with 
the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, he had expressed his
opposition to the Vietnam War and advocated resisting the draft.156  After
his election, his would-be colleagues claimed his statements advocated
law-breaking in the form of violating the selective service laws and otherwise 
dishonoring the House, and they argued he could not sincerely take the
oath of office swearing to uphold the Constitution, which was a requirement
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”
(emphasis added)). 
150. Id.; see also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106–07 (1973) (per curiam) (holding 
that First Amendment protects protestor’s statements advocating lawless action because 
they were “likely to[] produce imminent disorder”).
151. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
152. In defending S.B. 4, the state pointed to provisions allowing the legislature to 
define the “duties” of sheriffs. See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 74, at 39. 
153. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). 
154.  385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
155. Id. at 118. 
156. Id. at 118, 120–21. 
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to be seated as a legislator.157  The clerk refused to give him the oath, so Bond 
could not be seated.158  He brought a First Amendment suit.159 
The state argued that the Georgia Constitution provides qualifications 
for office—such as not being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude—and 
also provides that members can be removed, including for undefined 
“misconduct.”160  Thus, they argued, the legislature has the authority to
determine a legislator is unqualified.161  This includes the authority to determine, 
based on a legislator’s statements regarding public policy, whether the
legislator can sincerely swear to uphold the Constitution.162 
The Court held that the refusal to allow Bond to take the oath of office 
violates the First Amendment, because “[s]uch a power could be utilized 
to restrict the right of legislators to dissent from national or state policy or 
that of a majority of their colleagues under the guise of judging their loyalty 
to the Constitution.”163  The Court also rejected the legislature’s argument 
that their actions were justified by Bond’s alleged advocacy for draft-
dodging.164 The state did not argue that it could prevent citizens from
advocating against the draft, but argued instead that it could “apply a stricter 
standard to its legislators,” a premise the Court expressly rejected.165  Citing 
the principle that the “central commitment of the First Amendment,” is
that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,”166 
the Court observed 
[t]he interest of the public in hearing all sides of a public issue is hardly advanced
by extending more protection to citizen-critics than to legislators. Legislators have an
obligation to take positions on controversial political questions so that their
constituents can be fully informed by them, and be better able to assess their 
qualifications for office; also so they may be represented in governmental debates
by the person they have elected to represent them.167
 157. Id. at 123. 
158. Id.  The U.S. Constitution requires state legislators to swear to uphold the Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
 159. Bond, 385 U.S. at 125–26. 
160. Id. at 128–29. 
161. Id. at 130. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 132. 
164. Id. at 132–33. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 136 (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
167. Id. at 136–37. 
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Bond therefore supports an argument that a state cannot restrict speech
through a claimed enforcement of qualifications of office.  More broadly,
it also recognized the unique value of speech by elected officials, noting “[t]he
manifest function of the First Amendment in a representative government 
requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views
on issues of policy”168—both so the electorate can be fully informed and 
so the legislators can represent the people they were put into office to represent. 
This latter principle provides support for the argument, discussed below,
that lawmaking merits First Amendment protection. 
3. Government Employee Speech 
Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the state may not deny a
benefit, such as employment, on a basis that infringes constitutionally protected
interests—“especially” freedom of speech.169 However, the Court has also 
recognized that the government may restrict the speech of its employees 
“made pursuant to the employee’s official duties.”170  A state may therefore
argue—as Texas did in defending S.B. 4171—that because local governments
are, legally speaking, administrative subunits of the state, the state may restrict 
the speech of their officials under the doctrine allowing the government
to restrict the speech of its employees.172 
The arguments against such as position are compelling.  As a factual
matter, local government officials are not usually employees of the state 
and may not—in the case of volunteer legislators—be employees at all.173 
In Texas, for example, local government officials are elected pursuant to 
a city charter—their salaries are determined by the city charter or city
policymaking processes, and they are paid from city, not state, funds.174 
However, even though the state is not acting as an employer, neither is the
local official acting as the paradigm “citizen” speaking on a matter of public
concern in the model of a school employee writing a letter to the editor about 
168. Id. at 135–36. 
169. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006) (“It is well settled that ‘a State cannot condition public employment
on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of 
expression.’” (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983))).
170. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413, 426. 
171. See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 74, at 39. 
172. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418–19. 
173. See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 74, at 39 (noting that although 
sheriffs’ duties are defined by the legislature, sheriffs are elected by local voters and employed 
by counties). 
174. See, e.g., Randy Bear, City Council Salaries: To Pay or Not To Pay, RIVARD 
REP. (Nov. 24, 2013), https://therivardreport.com/city-council-salaries-to-pay-or-not-to-
pay/ [https://perma.cc/48ND-4WH3].
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an issue related to public education.175  But as Bond showed, elected officials’
speech in their capacities as legislators is just as worthy of protection as 
that of the “citizen-critic.”176 
In rejecting the state’s “employee speech” defense of S.B. 4’s “endorsement” 
policy, the district court noted that the employee speech doctrine turns on 
the role in which the state regulated.177  Because the state was acting as a
sovereign, not an employer, the employee speech doctrine was inapplicable.178 
This reasoning is compelling, and is consistent with Supreme Court precedent,
which establishes that the government’s “broader discretion to restrict speech” 
of its employees comes into play “when it acts in its role as employer.”179 
Moreover, the Court made clear that in order for the government speech
doctrine to apply, “the restrictions [the government] imposes must be directed 
at speech that has some potential to affect the entity’s operations.”180  In
other words, the reason the state, as employer, can limit its employees’ speech 
stems from the operational exigencies that affect any employer—a set of interests 
encompassing professionalism, consistency of message, or promotion of an 
official position.181 Thus, although an elected official’s speech in an official 
capacity may in some sense be “speech that owes its existence to a public
employee’s professional responsibilities,” restricting that speech does not 
“simply reflect[] the exercise of employer control over what the employer 
itself has commissioned or created.”182  An elected official is not hired by the
state to implement an official government policy; an official is a citizen
who has been elected to represent a larger group of citizens in determining 





 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 563, 568 (1968). 
 Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136–37 (1966). 




 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). 
Id.
 181. Id. at 422–23 (explaining operational reasons why the government, as employer, 
may need to control employee speech).  See generally Matt Wolfe, Does the First Amendment
Protect Testimony by Public Employees?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1473 (2010) (discussing post-
Garcetti case law). 
182. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22. 
183. Even further afield is the “narrow class of speech restrictions . . . based on an 
interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.”  Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010).  Under this line of cases, the Court has 
held that the government has more leeway to control speech in authoritarian environments
like schools, the military, and prisons.  Id.  Although a local government needs to be
able to “perform their functions,” this line of cases is simply not analogous. Id. (“These 
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In sum, states will likely have a difficult time justifying a limit on local
officials’ speech as government employee speech or under its interest in
ensuring that officeholders are law-abiding citizens.  The First Amendment
arguments against laws that burden “expressive” official actions, such 
as statements or resolutions endorsing a policy, are therefore strong.
B. Burdens on Lawmaking 
States may also violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment 
when they burden the passage of laws that may be held preempted. Because
lawmaking implicates a number of different speakers and kinds of expression, 
the starting point of this argument is identifying the speech burdened by
punitive preemption.  Although the First Amendment protects more than
just “speech,”184 analytic precision is necessary to sustain the novel argument 
that lawmaking can merit protection.
After identifying the nature of the speech burdened by limitations on 
lawmaking, this Section explores the strands of First Amendment doctrine 
offering grounds for protection of that speech.  As discussed in Part I, a
key point is that cities and states can legitimately disagree over whether 
the passage of a given law is within the city’s powers.  Although the legislature 
of a state that comes out on the losing side of a preemption lawsuit may
go back and pass a law that more clearly expresses its preemptive intent,
the state’s ability to do so may be limited by the state’s constitution. Thus, 
local lawmaking is both a statement about a substantive policy and a statement 
about the city’s authority to pass the law. 
1. Lawmaking and Expression 
The passage of a municipal ordinance involves a number of speakers and 
kinds of speech.  For example, a business group may bring a policy proposal
to a local official’s attention, and the official may have the proposal placed 
precedents stand only for the proposition that there are certain governmental functions that
cannot operate without some restrictions on particular kinds of speech.  By contrast, it is
inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be free to obtain information 
from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their votes.”).
184. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (explaining that the First
Amendment protects “the right to receive information and ideas”). See generally Ashutosh
Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2016) (discussing 
the rights protected under the First Amendment, including speech, religion, petition, and 
assembly).  As previously noted, this Article is concerned with the free speech clause; Mark 
Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in Living: Libraries, the 
Right To Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied Right To Receive Information, 
74 UMKC L. REV. 799 (2006) (discussing information-gathering as a protected right). 
30
MAY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2018 10:34 AM     
 



























[VOL. 55:  1, 2018] Punitive Preemption 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
on the city council agenda for public presentation and comment.185  The
public may also be invited to submit written comments,186 and the media 
may cover the proposal, generating more speech.  At some point, a draft 
ordinance is written, usually in whole or in part by municipal employees.
The ordinance is debated in a public setting, such as a city council meeting, 
in which the public may again be invited to share their views.  Finally, the
city council votes, and elected officials communicate their ayes and nays
through a voice vote or some other communicative act, such as pushing a 
button. The draft ordinance is now a law, the text of which will be incorporated 
in the municipal code. 
These various forms of expression can be divided into at least three
categories of speech that may be burdened by punitive preemption laws:
the text that constitutes the law, the public debate and discussion surrounding
whether the law should be passed, and the officials’ votes in favor of passing 
the law.  This Section explores the challenges to conceiving of any of these
categories, on their own, as protected speech burdened by punitive preemption
on their own.  It nevertheless concludes that punitive preemption burdens 
protected speech because limitations on lawmakers’ ability to vote on subjects 
favored by their constituents necessarily burdens the core political speech 
of the local electorate—speech at the heart of the First Amendment’s
protection.
a. The Law Itself
Although this Article does not argue that the law is itself protected
speech, it is helpful to take a moment to explain the challenges in the way
of such an argument, if for no other reason than to clarify what this Article
is not arguing.  Certainly, the text of the law—the enacted ordinance that 
becomes part of the city code—would appear to be speech.  But if the law
is speech, whose speech is it?  Although a local law is, in a very real sense, 
an expression of its citizens’ policy preferences, the entity that “speaks” 
those preferences through the text of the law is the municipal corporation. 
185. See, e.g., City of Austin Economic Development Proposal for National Instruments 
Corporation – Notice of Public Comment Period and City Council Meetings, AUSTINTEXAS.GOV, 
http://austintexas.gov/page/city-austin-economic-development-proposal-national-
instruments-corporation-notice-public-comment-period-and-city-council-meetings [https://
perma.cc/SB6N-ABMN] (describing the policymaking process involving a public comment
period, a city council informational presentation, and a final vote at a subsequent meeting). 
186. Id.
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This fact is not necessarily dispositive to a free speech inquiry.  The 
Court’s conceptualization, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
of a corporation as an association of citizens organized in corporate form
would suggest that a municipal corporation could have free speech rights.187 
However, a municipal corporation is also government. This may seem to
heighten the argument that a law is speech, given that the speech emerged
from a democratic policymaking process.  But while the Court has recognized 
that First Amendment limitations, such as viewpoint neutrality, do not
apply when the government is the speaker,188 it also has never held that
government speech enjoys First Amendment protections.  Nor is it likely
to do so, because the practical implication of conceptualizing a law
as protected speech is that “virtually every regulatory act of government 
could be transformed into an act of government expression, and then sheltered 
from attack under the shield of the First Amendment.”189 
An additional problem for conceptualizing the enacted law as speech 
that merits protection comes from the doctrine that cities are administrative
subunits of the state.190  Under the state creature doctrine, a state law limiting 
official city “speech” could be conceived of as a state limiting its own speech,
which a state would seem to be allowed to do under the government speech 
doctrine.191 
On the other hand, there are arguments to be made against applying the
government speech doctrine to state restrictions of the speech of municipal
corporations.  For example, in determining whether expression falls under
the “government speech” doctrine, the Court has considered a number of 
factors, such as “direct state control” that do not apply cleanly to the official 
actions of municipal corporations whose very purpose is to implement
 187. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 343, 356 (“Corporations and other associations, 
like individuals, contribute to the discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information 
and ideas that the First Amendment seeks to foster.  The Court has thus rejected the argument
that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the
First Amendment simply because such associations are not natural persons.” (citations 
omitted)); see also id. at 392 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he individual person’s right to
speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons.”).
188. See generally Gey, supra note 145 (describing and criticizing the Court’s government
speech doctrine).
189. See Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government 
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1442 (2001). 
190. See supra notes 1–2. 
191. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009).  The government 
speech doctrine is grounded in the premise that the government could not function if it had 
to be viewpoint neutral in its own speech, as the government necessarily must take positions in
order to govern. Id. at 468.  Note that this is a distinct issue from the government employee 
doctrine discussed above, which concerns the circumstances under which the state can limit
its employees’ speech.
32
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diverse local policies.192  Indeed, a small number of courts have suggested
that municipalities may enjoy free speech rights.193  For example, writing 
for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner suggested “if federal law imposed a 
fine on municipalities that passed resolutions condemning abortion, one might 
suggest that a genuine First Amendment issue would be presented.”194 While 
this hypothetical has some similarities to the issues presented in this Article, 
it does not implicate the significant problem that cities are conceived of as
creatures of the state, not the federal government. 
An argument may therefore exist that municipal corporations enjoy free 
speech rights against state restriction.  However, given the challenges facing 
such an argument, this Article will instead focus on the protections that may
exist for lawmakers and the public that participates in the policymaking
process.
b. Public Debate 
A second kind of speech that is burdened by punitive preemption is the 
advocacy, protest, and debate by citizens and lawmakers that precede the 
passage of a local law.  As observed above, a key principle underlying the
First Amendment is that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
 192. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 
2249 (2015) (identifying specialty license plates as government speech because they have
long been used by the state to convey state messages, they are closely identified in the
public mind with the state, and the state maintained “direct control over the messages,”
the latter of which, at a minimum, does not apply to city speech). The government speech 
doctrine is based on the premise that the government needs to be able to express a viewpoint
in order to govern.  In holding that trademarks are not government speech in Matal v. Tam, 
the Court found it significant that the trademarks were not an expression of a government 
policy.  137 S. Ct. 1744, 1758 (2017).  If they were, the government would be “babbling prodigiously
and incoherently.” Id.  A similar claim could be made to the enactments of local governments. 
The Court in Matal also warned that because the doctrine could be used to “muffle the expression 
of disfavored viewpoints” by finding a way to cast private speech as government, courts 
must “exercise great caution before extending our government-speech precedents.”  Id. 
193. See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 1637, 1643 nn.24–32 (2006) (collecting cases in which courts have recognized that 
municipal corporations may have First Amendment rights).  But see Creek v. Village
of Westhaven, 80 F.3d 186, 192–93 (7th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases in which courts have 
rejected arguments that municipalities have free speech rights).
194. Creek, 80 F.3d at 193. 
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robust, and wide-open,”195 and the citizen speech involved in passing a law
is nothing if not core political speech.196 
It is also speech that is qualitatively different from public debate 
surrounding a policy in the abstract because the law, if passed, will impose 
real restrictions on the speaker.  This context makes the expression of one 
who speaks in support of, for example, banning plastic bags in her jurisdiction 
in a public hearing the day of the city council vote on the draft ordinance 
meaningfully different from speech expressing general support for bag bans 
at any other time.  Likewise, the lawmaking process also requires the scope
of a possible ordinance to be considered and debated in significant detail, 
forcing lawmakers and advocates to confront, discuss, and address hard
trade-offs and negative side effects.
Passing a law also inspires a greater quantity of speech. The possibility
that the city may pass an ordinance will likely bring out speakers in opposition
to the ordinance, who may not otherwise find themselves motivated to
participate in the debate without the immediate threat of its passage.  The 
media will certainly cover the debate regarding an ordinance that may actually 
pass with far greater attention than it would abstract advocacy of a policy
disconnected to any concrete policy initiative. The passage of a law also has 
a greater chance of attracting the attention of other cities or even a nationwide 
audience, particularly when the city and state disagree over whether the 
state can preempt the city law.
Burdens on local lawmaking thus indirectly burden the unique form of 
public debate that precedes the passage of a law.  The Court has repeatedly 
recognized that “[l]aws enacted to control or suppress speech may operate 
at different points in the speech process,”197 such that free speech rights
may be violated by laws that “necessarily reduce[] the quantity of expression
by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached.”198  For example, in Meyer v. Grant, 
discussed further below, the Court invalidated restrictions on the use of paid 
petition-gatherers to help get a citizen referendum on the statewide ballot.199 
The restriction was held invalid, even though it was not a direct restriction
on speech, because the procedural restriction was likely to reduce the amount 
of speech on topics the policy advocates wanted to discuss.200  Even outside 
the realm of political speech, the Court’s precedents make clear that it offends
195.  N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
196. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988) (defining core political speech as
“interactive communication concerning political change” (citing Schaumburg v. Citizens 
for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980))). 
197.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010). 
198. Id. at 339 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam)). 
199.  486 U.S. at 414. 
200. Id.
34
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the First Amendment to take actions that prevent or deter speech from 
happening in the first place.201  Thus, even without restricting public debate, 
punitive preemption burdens public debate by restricting the topics discussed, 
the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. 
c. The Lawmaker’s Vote
The third category of speech that may be burdened by punitive preemption 
is the local official’s act202 of voting on the law.203 The question of whether
a vote can be speech is a complicated one.  As a starting point, a lawmaker’s
vote certainly involves expression of a political viewpoint that the proposed
ordinance is good policy supported by the voting public and that the city
has the authority to pass the ordinance—i.e., it is not preempted).  And
just as public debate in the context of lawmaking is qualitatively different 
from advocacy in support of a policy in the abstract, a lawmakers’ vote sends 
a different and more powerful message than other kinds of expression. It 
is akin to special nature, recognized in the Court’s cases considering
associational rights, of group speech that—because it is group speech— 
conveys a different and often more powerful message than speech by
individuals.204  This is not to say that a lawmaker’s vote is an exercise of 
201. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 116 (1991) (invalidating law that prohibited a person from keeping the profits of
selling the tales of their criminal activity because it offends the First Amendment to create
a disincentive to speaking).
202. Even though a vote may be an act (e.g., pushing a button or making a gesture)
rather than speech (saying ‘aye’ or ‘nay’), the Court has in recent years demonstrated a 
great willingness to recognize speech-facilitating conduct as speech.  See Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 336–37.  Voting is also a poor fit for the “expressive conduct” doctrine under
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 382 (1968) (stating that the case before it was 
one “where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct arises in some measure 
because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful”).
Under O’Brien, restrictions on conduct that involves both “speech” and “nonspeech”
elements can be sustained if they “further[ ] an important or substantial governmental interest” 
that is “unrelated to the suppression of free expression and . . . is no greater than is essential 
to the furtherance of that interest.” Id. at 377.  But punitive preemption is hardly content-
neutral, because the state is not burdening voting in general; it is burdening voting based
on the subject being voted upon. 
203. A local official can also be a speaker advocating for a law’s passage whose speech 
falls into the category of “public debate” described above. See supra Section IV(B)(1)(b). 
The focus of this Section is the act of passing the law, as distinct from any advocacy or 
explanation the lawmaker provides in addition to his vote. 
204. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“Effective advocacy
of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably
 35
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associational rights, but rather that, like group messages, a vote conveys
a unique message that cannot be conveyed any other way.
But even if a lawmaker’s vote conveys a message, this does not necessarily 
mean it is expressive activity recognized by the First Amendment.  Certainly, 
the Court has recognized that when a citizen casts a vote in the electoral 
process, the citizen expresses a political viewpoint.205  The Court has also 
held that other forms of political participation, such as signing a petition 
to place a referendum before voters, implicate First Amendment rights.206 
However, the Court has expressly distinguished a citizen’s vote from 
that of a lawmaker, holding in Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan207 
that a legislator does not have a personal free speech right in the act of 
casting a vote. Carrigan involved a First Amendment challenge by a local
lawmaker who had been censured by a state ethics commission because
he voted in favor of a hotel-casino project that would financially benefit his 
longtime campaign manager, in violation of state conflict-of-interest laws.208 
The Court rejected the challenge. Although it relied in large part on the
long tradition of conflict-of-interest laws dating back to the founding
era,209 it also justified that tradition on the grounds that a lawmaker has no 
enhanced by group association . . . .” (citations omitted)).  Indeed, the text of the First 
Amendment does not mention freedom of association; that right flows in part from the free 
speech clause because the right to speak includes the right to speak as part of a group
because of the unique message thereby conveyed. See Bhagwat, supra note 184, at 1116 
(explaining that a message conveyed by a group is qualitatively different than a message 
conveyed by an individual); see also John D. Inazu, The First Amendment’s Public Forum, 
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1177–80 (2015) (criticizing the collapsing of speech and 
associational rights in certain Court precedents).
205. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992) (recognizing that voting involves
“expressive activity at the polls”); see also Richard E. Levy, The Nonpartisanship Principle, 25 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 377, 380 (2015) (“Although the Supreme Court has not definitively
addressed the issue, it is reasonable to assume that the act of casting a vote is a form of 
speech.”).
206. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194–95 (2010) (“An individual expresses a view on
a political matter when he signs a petition under Washington’s referendum procedure. . . .  
[T]he expression of a political view implicates a First Amendment right.”). Reed demonstrates
the difficulty the Court has balancing the expressive component of participation in electoral
policies with the legitimate state interest in regulating electoral processes: it generated five
concurring opinions, at least one of which was joined by each justice, except Chief Justice 
Roberts, who authored the Court’s opinion, as well as a dissent from Justice Thomas. Id. at
190, 202, 212, 215 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), 219, 228 (Scalia, J., concurring).
207. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 126 (2001); see also Reed, 
561 U.S. at 221–22 (Scalia, J., concurring) (reasoning that signing a referendum is a legislative 
act that does not merit First Amendment protection). 
208. Carrigan, 564 U.S. at 120.  The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, also 
scoffed at the idea that a vote conveys a message, given that a wide range of factors may
influence a lawmaker’s vote. See id. at 126. 
209. Id. at 122–23. 
36
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personal right in a vote.210 A legislator’s vote, the Court reasoned, is not the
legislator’s personal speech, but rather a “commitment of his apportioned 
share of the legislature’s power,” which “belongs to the people.”211 
Although Carrigan appears to present a challenge to First Amendment
protections for local lawmaking, the holding that a lawmaker has no personal
right to vote on a proposal for which he has a personal conflict is distinguishable 
in important respects from a situation in which limitations on a lawmaker’s
vote interfere with local democratic processes.  Justice Kennedy recognized
this distinction in his concurring opinion in Carrigan. The specific source
of Kennedy’s concern was that the text of the statute—which prohibited
voting on matters in which the lawmaker’s independence was affected by 
“[h]is commitment in a private capacity to the interests of others”—could
be read to prohibit votes by a legislator that were influenced by the legislator’s
ties to a community of advocates sharing a particular political outlook.212 
As Justice Kennedy explained, voting on policies favored by supporters, 
including supporters with whom a lawmaker may have personal connections 
because of a shared history of political activity, is precisely what lawmakers
are supposed to do.213  Thus, even if a lawmaker has no personal expressive
right to cast a vote, limitations on the topics that a lawmaker can vote on may
be impermissible if those limitations burden the core political speech of
the voters who elected that official to represent their interests.  This argument 
was not at issue in, and therefore not foreclosed by, Carrigan.214 
Justice Kennedy’s reasoning also expressly recognized the broader principle 
that limitations on lawmakers’ votes have a “logical and inevitable burden
 210. Id. at 125–26. 
211. Id.  In concurrence, Justice Alito disagreed with the Court that “restrictions 
upon legislators’ voting are not restrictions upon legislators’ protected speech[.]” Id. at 
126, 133 (Alito, J., concurring).  Justice Alito took the position that “[v]oting has an expressive
component in and of itself.”  Id. at 133. Alito also noted the Court’s decision was difficult
to square with its opinion in Doe v. Reed, in which the Court observed that “the expression 
of a political view implicates a First Amendment right.” Id. at 133–34; Reed, 561 U.S. at 
195. 
212. Carrigan, 564 U.S. at 129–30 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 281A.420(2) (2007)). 
213. Id. at 131–32 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court has made it clear that ‘the 
right of citizens to band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse 
their political views’ is among the First Amendment’s most pressing concerns.” (quoting 
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005))). 
214. Carrigan also observed that the conflict-of-interest law did not constitute viewpoint
discrimination. Id. at 125. 
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on speech and association that preceded the vote.”215  Thus, statutes that 
impose a burden on a lawmaker’s vote must be considered in light of the
“burdens they impose on the First Amendment speech rights of legislators
and constituents apart from an asserted right to engage in the act of casting
a vote.”216  Because “[t]he democratic process presumes a constant interchange
of voices,” a statute that restricts a lawmaker’s vote “may well impose
substantial burdens on what undoubtedly is speech.”217 
The recognition that burdening a vote can burden core political speech
does not end the inquiry, however.218  A second issue is that a vote serves a
functional purpose in the process of governing. In Carrigan, the Court 
observed that a legislator enjoys no right to “use government mechanics
to convey a message.”219  The Court has recognized an analogous principle 
in case law involving elections: the state has an interest in regulating electoral
processes, even though procedural restrictions inevitably have some impact
on speech and association.220 For example, recognizing that states may
implement “reasonable, politically neutral regulations that have the effect
of channeling expressive activity at the polls,” the Court in Burdick v. Takushi
upheld a ban on write-in votes.221  The Court explained that elections have
a purpose—electing officials—and the state’s interest in regulating the voting 
process may justify restrictions on the expressive component of the vote.222
 215. Id. at 131 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The constitutionality of a law prohibiting 
a legislative or executive official from voting on matters advanced by or associated with a
political supporter is therefore a most serious matter from the standpoint of the logical and
inevitable burden on speech and association that preceded the vote.”).
First Amendment protection, such as libel, sexual harassment, or securities laws violations. 
216. Id. at 129. 
217. Id.
218. The law readily proscribes a wide range of speech that simply falls outside of 
See generally Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004).  However, this speech 
falls outside the First Amendment either because the free speech guarantee does not cover
false statements or because it must be possible to punish crimes that are effectuated
through words. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340–41 (1974).  This seems 
unlikely given its political nature.
219. Carrigan, 564 U.S. at 127; see also Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 221–22 (2010) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that when a voter signs a referendum to place an initiative on
the ballot, he is acting as a legislator, and the plaintiffs had identified “no precedent from
this Court holding that legislating is protected by the First Amendment” (citing Republican 
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U. S. 765, 788 (2002))). 
220. See Reed, 561 U.S. at 195–96 (“To the extent a regulation concerns the legal 
effect of a particular activity in that [electoral] process, the government will be afforded
substantial latitude to enforce that regulation.”); id. at 212–13 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
221.  504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992). 
222. Id. at 438. The Court also recognized that Art. I, § 4 of the Constitution allows 
states to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections.  Id. at 433.  Justice Kennedy, in dissent, 
went farther, arguing the “right to freedom of expression [was] not implicated” by the ban 
on write-in votes. Id. at 445 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). On the other hand, Justice Kennedy
38
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Thus, a First Amendment argument against punitive preemption must
address the argument that local lawmaking has a purpose—passing laws— 
and whatever expressive component it also has may be regulated because 
preemption serves important purposes, such as protecting citizens from 
inconsistent burdens imposed by different levels of government.  But the
fact that a law, once passed, may be unenforceable because it is preempted 
is distinct from the question whether the state can prevent the law from
being passed in the first place.  As has been noted several times, the argument 
of this Article is not that local majorities should be able to enact and enforce
any policy they choose; it is that they should be able to pass laws and, if
challenged, defend their right to enforce them in court.  The interests protected
by preemption—preventing different levels of government from subjecting
citizens to inconsistent and competing laws—are served by the fact that a
preempted law is unenforceable.  It does not take a prohibition on passing
the law in the first place to serve that interest.223 
A related issue is that a legislator’s vote is an act with substantive legal 
effect. On the one hand, the Court has never held that expressive activity 
loses its protection because it has legal effect—and indeed has held the 
opposite: “adding [a] legal effect to an expressive activity” does not “somehow 
deprive[] that activity of its expressive component, taking it outside the
scope of the First Amendment.”224  It has applied this principle in a number
of contexts. For example, it held that the government violated the First
Amendment by preventing a band from registering an offensive trademark— 
a trademark being a substantive act that confers legal rights and benefits 
on the registrant.225  Likewise, in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, discussed 
in detail below, the Court invalidated a law preventing the recipients
of certain federal funds from bringing certain kinds of lawsuits.226  It, too,
involved speech with a substantive legal effect.
In Carrigan, however, the Court distinguished an expressive activity 
that does not lose First Amendment protections because it has a legal
expressed significant concern that because Hawaii’s elections are dominated by the Democratic
party, the write-in ban functioned to disadvantage political minorities. See id. at 444–46. 
223. One can argue states also have an interest in avoiding preemption lawsuits. See 
infra Section IV(B)(2)(d). 
224. Reed, 561 U.S. at 195 (noting that the act of signing a referendum petition, which
has the legal effect of helping place the referendum on the ballot, is protected expression 
under the First Amendment). 
225. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752–53 (2017) (noting that trademarks may be
used without registration, but registration “confers important legal rights and benefits”). 
226.  531 U.S. 533, 536–37 (2001). 
 39
MAY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2018 10:34 AM     
 
 
    
  























    
 
 
effect from “a governmental act [that] becomes expressive simply because 
the governmental actor wishes it to be so.”227 Specifically, the Court
distinguished a citizen’s act of signing a petition to place a referendum on
the statewide ballot—held to be First Amendment speech in John Doe No. 
1 v. Reed228—from the City Council member’s vote on his friend’s casino 
project at issue in Carrigan. The distinction the Court seems to be drawing 
is fine indeed:  in both cases, the activity at issue—the act of signing or the
act of voting—would not exist but for the substantive legal process in which 
the citizen or lawmaker, respectively, is participating.  In any case, Carrigan’s
focus was on the personal expressive function a lawmaker may wish to 
fulfill through voting,229 and it did not address a situation in which a restriction 
on lawmakers’ votes restricted their ability to fulfill the purposes for which 
they were elected by their constituents. 
Ultimately, then, the importance of an official’s vote to a First Amendment
argument against punitive preemption is not grounded in the personal 
expressive component of the act of voting.  Rather, punitive preemption
burdens a lawmaking process with unique communicative functions, which 
concern both the substantive policy and the balance of state-local power.  The 
uniqueness stems from the fact that at the end of the process, lawmakers
vote. The vote is both a precondition to public debate and a statement reflecting,
albeit imperfectly, the electorate’s sentiment about a controversial issue. 
Particularly under the current court’s broad conception of First Amendment 
protections,230 therefore, strong support exists for the argument that limitations
on a local officials’ ability to vote on laws favored by their constituents
implicates the First Amendment by limiting the unique form of political
expression that goes into lawmaking. 
2. First Amendment Protections for Local Lawmaking 
This Section explores First Amendment doctrines supporting an argument
that the state’s power to preempt does not extend to prohibiting the passage 
of the possibly-preempted laws in the first place, rather than allowing
preemption to play out through the traditional push and pull.  This argument 
is descriptive. The attempt to find a coherent theory or even descriptive account 
underlying First Amendment precedents has generated an enormous body 
227. 
228. 
 Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 128 (2001). 
 561 U.S. at 195. 
229.  564 U.S. at 126. 
230. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 
1456–58 (2013) (describing the history of the expansion of protected First Amendment 
speech).
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of scholarship to which this Article does not intend to add.231  However, 
it does draw on the certain underlying normative principles that have been
recognized by the Court, even if those principles are not consistently applied.232 
It argues that First Amendment prohibitions on viewpoint discrimination 
within state-created fora and on laws designed to insulate the state from legal 
challenge both offer strong support for a First Amendment argument against 
punitive preemption, particularly in light of the normative emphasis the Court
has consistently placed on speech in aid of democratic self-government. 
a. Democratic Deliberation as a Normative Underpinning
Many are the instances in which the Court has said, with lofty prose and 
sweeping rhetoric, that the core purpose of the First Amendment is to protect
robust public debate.233  Scholars have likewise argued the key normative
principle underlying First Amendment doctrine is the need for information to
be freely exchanged in a system of democratic self-government.234 This
approach leads to a focus on the “quality of the expressive arena,” for speech
 231. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1785 (2004) (describing 
the scholarly search for coherent theories underlying the First Amendment and concluding
that “descriptive or explanatory accounts of the existing coverage of the First Amendment
are noticeably unsatisfactory”).
232. See Schauer, supra note 218, at 1786–87 (noting that the “historically recognized
and judicially mentioned normative theories” include “self-expression, individual autonomy,
dissent, democratic deliberation, the search for truth, tolerance, checking governmental abuse, 
and others”). 
233. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 347 (1976) (“[P]olitical belief and association 
constitute . . . the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment.”); Bond v. 
Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966) (“The central commitment of the First Amendment . . . 
is that ‘debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’” (quoting 
N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 
484 (1957) (noting that the First Amendment “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange 
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people”). 
234. See, e.g., James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of 
American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 497–504 (2011).  Perhaps the
quintessential foundational text for this position is Alexander Meiklejohn’s Free Speech
and Its Relation to Self-Governance. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 26–27 (1948) (“The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the
necessities of the program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or Reason in the 
abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be 
decided by universal suffrage.”).
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related to public policy matters, rather than on the individual’s opportunities 
for self-expression.235 
This principle has been embraced by Justices across the spectrum, as
illustrated by the long struggle over electoral expenditures that culminated
in Citizens United.236  Some Justices came from the position that the First 
Amendment required public debate to be fair, so that well-funded voices 
did not result in less-funded voices going unheard.237  Others came from
the position that, even though fair debate was a worthy goal, it could not be
pursued through limitations on speech because “a self-governing people
depends upon the free exchange of political information.”238  This latter 
rationale was embraced by the Court in invalidating the ban on corporate 
expenditures in Citizens United:  “The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, 
to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to
enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”239 
Importantly, however, both positions are grounded in the principle that the 
First Amendment protects the exchange of information in service of self-
government. 
Citizens United, like many of the Court’s precedents involving “political
speech,” involved electoral speech: i.e., speech by and about candidates.240 
However, although political speech “includes” the discussions of candidates
running for office,241 it also broadly includes the “free discussion of 
governmental affairs.”242  The principle that “legislative restrictions on advocacy
of the election or defeat of political candidates are wholly at odds with the 
guarantees of the First Amendment” therefore “applies equally to the 
discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or
defeat of legislation.”243
 235. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 424 (1996). 
236.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
237. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399–403 (2000) (Breyer, 
J., Concurring) (drawing on the writings of Meiklejohn for the premise that the First Amendment 
is premised on full and fair discussion of public issues). 
exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement 
238. 
239. 
Id. at 411. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 558 U.S. at 339. 
240. Id. at 446. 
241. 
242. 
 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966). 
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52–53 (1982) (“Whatever differences may
that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs.  This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government,
the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters 
relating to political processes.” (quoting Mills, 384 U.S. at 218–19)). 
243. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 428 (1988) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 50, 96 (1976)).
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Thus, the fact that punitive preemption restricts democratic deliberation—
and often has that restriction as its goal—should generate suspicion in and
of itself. In addition to this normative grounding, three specific strands of 
First Amendment doctrine support an argument against punitive preemption:
cases invalidating laws with the effect of limiting public debate, laws that
discriminate based on viewpoint in a public forum, and laws designed to
insulate the government from challenge. 
b. Limitations on Public Debate 
The Court has enforced the normative principle that the First Amendment
protects against laws with the effect of limiting public debate in analogous 
cases involving citizen referenda.244  One of the most powerful is Meyer
v. Grant, in which the Court held that a Colorado law criminalizing the 
use of paid petition-gatherers in service of a citizen’s referendum violated
the First Amendment.245  The citizens were attempting to pass a law deregulating
the trucking industry under a Colorado law allowing citizens to place a
proposal to amend the state Constitution on the ballot if five percent of
qualified voters signed a petition supporting it.246  Concerned that paid
petition-gatherers were more likely to engage in fraud, Colorado passed a 
law making it a felony to hire them.  The advocates of the trucking amendment 
challenged the law, and the Court ruled in their favor.247 
The Court first held that the case “involve[d] a limitation on political
expression subject to exacting scrutiny.”248  This was because
[t]he circulation of an initiative petition of necessity involves both the expression
of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change. 
Although a petition circulator may not have to persuade potential signatories that 
a particular proposal should prevail to capture their signatures, he or she will at 
least have to persuade them that the matter is one deserving of the public scrutiny
and debate that would attend its consideration by the whole electorate. This will
in almost every case involve an explanation of the nature of the proposal and why
its advocates support it. Thus, the circulation of a petition involves the type of
 244. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (holding that the 
First Amendment protects speech related to passage of a citizens referendum); Buckley v. 
Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 197–200 (1999) (same). 
245.  486 U.S. at 428. 
246. Id. at 416–22. 
247. Id. at 417, 428. 
248. Id. at 420. 
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rning political change that is appropriately described 
The Court concluded the law failed strict scrutiny for two reasons:  “it
limits the number of voices who will convey appellees’ message and the 
hours they can speak and, therefore, limits the size of the audience they can 
reach,” and “it makes it less likely that appellees will garner the number
of signatures necessary to place the matter on the ballot, thus limiting their 
ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion.”250  The Court
subsequently made clear that even minor impediments to participation— 
a requirement that petition-gatherers be registered voters and that they
wear identification badges—are impermissible under this principle.251 
Both of these concerns are directly applicable to punitive preemption. 
First, as described above, the public debate engendered by a draft ordinance
will be qualitatively and quantitatively different from a policy debate with 
no possibility of action, such as a speech by the mayor advocating a policy
in the abstract.  It again bears noting that two kinds of debate are implicated: 
the substantive policy issue and the question of whether the local law should 
be preempted.  Thus, by prohibiting the city from considering the passage
of a law and, if necessary, triggering a legal showdown, punitive preemption 
“limits the size of the audience” for these important debates and makes it
less likely that the local support for the law and belief that the law is not 
preempted is “the focus of statewide discussion.”252 
In Meyer, the Court also rejected two arguments that could be brought 
to bear in support of punitive preemption.  First, it was irrelevant that the 
advocates of trucking deregulation had many alternative ways they could 
communicate their support for trucking deregulation when the law burdened 
their chosen means: ballot initiative circulated by paid petitioners.253 The
Court has “consistently refused to overlook an unconstitutional restriction 
upon some First Amendment activity simply because it leaves other First
Amendment activity unimpaired,”254 because “the First Amendment protects
appellees’ right not only to advocate their cause but also to select what
they believe to be the most effective means for so doing.”255  This is an 
important point for an argument against punitive preemption.  Certainly, 
there are many ways for local officials and citizens to debate a policy issue
without actually passing a law.  A local official prohibited from passing a
 249. Id. at 421–22. 




 Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 197 (1999). 




 Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 581 (2000). 
Meyer, 486 U.S. at 424. 
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law may still give speeches, call for informational presentations at city council, 
pen op-eds, tweet, or communicate with the electorate and policymakers
in myriad ways other than passing the law.  Meyer confirms that the mere 
fact that all speech has not been restricted does not excuse the restrictions
that do exist. 
The second important point from Meyer is that the Court rejected the 
state’s argument that “because the power of the initiative is a state-created
right, it is free to impose limitations on the exercise of that right.”256  One
can easily imagine a state defending punitive preemption on similar grounds:
because state preemption doctrines ultimately allow the state to render
preempted local laws invalid, the state must also have the power to limit
passage of such laws in the first place. This argument fails as a factual matter
as to laws that have not been held preempted in court because the power
the state is claiming is the larger power to burden not only the passage of 
laws that are preempted—those held preempted by a court—but also those 
that might be preempted.  In any event, Meyer rejects the “greater-includes- 
the-lesser” justification, holding that the power to ban initiatives entirely 
does not “include[] the power to limit discussion of political issues raised
in initiative petitions.”257 
Meyer thus supports an argument that punitive preemption violates the 
First Amendment by limiting public debate.  An objection that could be
raised, however, is that all preemption can be seen as “limiting public debate” 
at the level of government at which preemption applies.258  That is, if the
state provides that local governments cannot pass gun laws, then following 
the passage of that law there is no public issue as to what the local gun 
law should be—it has already been decided at the state level, presumably
after public debate, that there should not be such a law. It cannot be the case
that any law with the effect of limiting debate at one level of government 
runs afoul of the First Amendment: if it did, the doctrine of preemption 
could not exist.259 
But even if there exists no affirmative right to have all topics open for
consideration by policymakers at all levels of government at all times, this
is a different question from whether the state can burden the passage of 
256. Id.
 257. Id. at 425
 258. 
259. 
See generally supra, Section IV(B)(1). 
Likewise, Constitutional guarantees “limit public debate” by taking certain 
topics off the table for possible lawmaking.  See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members 
of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991). 
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possibly preempted laws for the purpose of foreclosing debate. As has 
been noted several times, because the doctrine of preemption renders 
preempted laws unenforceable, the only practical effect of punitive preemption
is to dissuade cities from testing the boundaries of the preempted subject
area. This purpose sets punitive preemption apart from “regular” preemption 
for First Amendment purposes.
c. Viewpoint Discrimination in a Public Forum 
A First Amendment argument against punitive preemption is also 
supported by the limited public forum doctrine, under which the state 
is prohibited from imposing viewpoint-based restrictions in a forum it has
created.260  The doctrine is an application of the broader principle that
viewpoint discrimination is anathema to the First Amendment.261  The Court 
has frequently articulated this principle as a limitation on government power 
that is distinct from any specific effect on particular speakers or speech: a
rule that the First Amendment does not allow the government to act with 
the purpose of suppressing a particular viewpoint.262  Although the Court
has denied that motive is the touchstone of the First Amendment inquiry,263 
260.  Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001). 
261. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (invalidating a hate-speech
ordinance as viewpoint discrimination); see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558
U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment 
stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints . . . .”). 
262. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
830 (1995) (“[I]deologically driven attempts to suppress a particular point of view are 
presumptively unconstitutional . . . .”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 
641 (1994) (“Government action that stifles speech on account of its message . . . pose the
inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to
suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion
rather than persuasion.”); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
695 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment is a limitation on government . . . .”);
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386 (“The government may not regulate based on hostility—or
favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.”); City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986) (“This Court has long held that regulations
enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the basis of its content presumptively
violate the First Amendment.”); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (“[W]hen regulation is based on the content of speech, 
governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has 
not been prohibited ‘merely because public officials disapprove the speaker’s views.’” 
(quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in 
result))); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785–86 (1978) (stating that where 
“the legislature’s suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable
public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment
is plainly offended” (footnote omitted)).
263. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“[T]he ‘purpose’ of
Congress . . . is not a basis for declaring legislation unconstitutional.”). 
46
MAY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2018 10:34 AM     
 






















   
 
 
   
  
  




[VOL. 55:  1, 2018] Punitive Preemption 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
a number of scholars, including now-Justice Kagan, have observed that many
First Amendment doctrines are best explained as a search for impermissible 
motives.264  Indeed, the Court’s explanations of its doctrines often sound
strongly in a search for an improper censorial purpose.265 
Thus, under the “limited public forum” doctrine, when the state creates
a forum, “the state may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable
and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials 
oppose the speaker’s view.”266  Although the doctrine was originally applied 
to physical fora, such as public parks,267 it now also applies to “metaphysical”
fora, such as public funding for student organizations, even when these 
“limited” fora are not open to the general public.268 
The paradigm case is Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University 
of Virginia, in which the Court considered a university policy under which 
student media groups could apply for funds to subsidize their publishing, 
but a publication with a Christian editorial viewpoint could not apply.  The 
Court held this was impermissible viewpoint discrimination because the
forum—funding for student media—was created to encourage a free exchange 
of ideas, and it did not exclude “religion” from the subject matters allowed
to be exchanged in the forum, but it did exclude a Christian editorial
viewpoint.269  This was impermissible because once the state creates a forum,
it cannot “exclude speech where its distinction is not ‘reasonable in light
of the purpose served by the forum’” or “discriminate against speech on the 
basis of its viewpoint.”270 Thus, in a limited public forum, content discrimination 
may be permissible “if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum,”
 264. Kagan, supra note 235, at 415, 423 (“[T]he concern with governmental motive 
remains a hugely important—indeed, the most important—explanatory factor in First
Amendment law.”); Sunstein, supra note 144, at 26 (explaining that “the removal of impermissible 
reasons for government action” is one of the animating forces behind viewpoint discrimination). 
265. See supra note 262. 
266.  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 
267. See Inazu, supra note 204, at 1162–67; see also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 696 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing genesis of public 
forum doctrine). 
268. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
830 (1995).
269. Id. at 830–31. 
270. Id. at 829 (first quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 
473 U.S. 788, 804–06 (1985); then citing Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392–93 (1993)). 
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while viewpoint discrimination “is presumed impermissible when directed
against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”271 
Local lawmaking bodies are state-created fora because municipal corporations 
are chartered under state law to debate and enact laws favored by local voters. 
However, the purpose of the forum is not primarily expressive: local lawmaking
bodies exist to enact policy, not merely to discuss and debate it. As discussed 
further below, however, the Court has applied a public forum analysis to
prohibit viewpoint discrimination in government funding of legal challenges
brought in the courts.272  Thus, although it is not self-evident that a local
lawmaking body falls under the public forum doctrine, the Court’s precedents 
show that a forum need not be purely expressive—whatever that might 
mean—to fall under the rule that the government may not discriminate 
based on viewpoint. 
But is punitive preemption viewpoint discrimination?  After all, the range
of laws that a local government can pass are, at their core, a function of
state law. Isn’t punitive preemption simply the permissible enforcement
of the boundaries of fora—local lawmaking bodies—the state created to 
consider and pass those laws cities have been authorized to pass? The problem 
with defining the forum in this way is, again, that it is not necessarily self-
evident whether a proposed local policy is preempted.  Thus, a forum allowing
the free discussion of all policies a city is authorized to enact must also include, 
within its permissible categories of content, communication regarding 
whether a given policy is, in fact, preempted.  The forum could not function
otherwise. Because the content area of “what is preempted?” is included
in the forum, then the state cannot discriminate against the viewpoint that 
“law X is not preempted.”
Relatedly, however, it could also be argued that punitive preemption 
targets content only and not viewpoint.  To illustrate, a content restriction 
is one that excludes films about parenting, while a restriction on films about
parenting from a “Christian perspective” is viewpoint discrimination.273 
Punitive preemption is arguably more like the former category: it takes an
entire subject matter, such as guns, off the table for local regulation, regardless
 271. Id. at 829–30. It has often been observed that the line between “defining the 
forum” and viewpoint discrimination is difficult to draw, and that the Court’s use of the 
“government speech” doctrine has somewhat eroded the doctrine. See, e.g., Gey, supra
note 145, at 1295–98.  As argued above, however, when the state has authorized local 
decisionmaking bodies for the purpose of enacting local, not state policies, it is difficult
to see why the lawmaking that goes on in those decisionmaking bodies would be seen as
the speech of the state.
272. E.g., Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543 (2001). 
273. See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393–94. 
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of whether the local official’s policy preferences are more liberal or more
conservative than the state policymakers.274 
However, this argument is akin to the old saying that the law equally 
“forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges.”275  As a
practical matter, punitive preemption only burdens the passage of laws 
that are more strict—in the sense of prohibiting more conduct—than the 
state law, because there would be no reason to pass a local law that is less
strict than the state law.  For example, an extremely pro-gun city could
theoretically pass a law requiring less gun control measures than those 
required by the state, but the law would have no effect because its citizens 
would still be subject to the state’s restrictions.  As a practical matter, therefore, 
punitive preemption is a form of viewpoint discrimination.276 
Thus, although the Court’s public forum cases are not a precise fit, they
support an argument against punitive preemption.  Because preempted 
laws cannot be enforced, the punitive provisions serve no purpose beyond 
preventing local lawmakers from making the statement of passing a law. 
In other words, the primary purpose is to suppress a viewpoint favored by
local majorities within a forum that the state created to allow those local 
majorities to enact policies they favor, merely because state legislators disagree
with that viewpoint. Particularly given the close relationship between the 
public forum doctrine and the normative interest in democratic deliberation,277 
the public forum doctrine therefore supports a First Amendment argument
against punitive preemption.
d. Insulating the Government from Legal Challenge
One can argue that punitive preemption serves a purpose other than
viewpoint discrimination: by deterring cities from passing laws that may
be preempted in the first place, it protects the state from having to litigate
whether those laws are preempted.  Thus, additional support for First
 274. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831. 
275. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 75 (The Modern Library, Inc. 1917) (1894). 
276. In the context of expressive conduct, the Court maintains a distinction between
content-based and content-neutral laws, despite the fact that an ostensibly content-neutral 
law will often disproportionately affect one viewpoint.  See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation 
and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 218–22 (1983).  As Stone has pointed
out, few are those who burn a draft card as a message of support for a governmental policy.
Id.
 277. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 696 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (noting that the public forum doctrine is “essential to a functioning democracy”). 
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Amendment limitations on punitive preemption comes from the rule that
laws designed to insulate the government from legal challenge offend the 
First Amendment. 
The key case is Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, in which the 
Court invalidated a federal statute that prevented recipients of federal legal
services funds from bringing suit attempting to amend or otherwise challenge
existing welfare laws.278  The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) was a
nonprofit organization that distributed funds for noncriminal legal aid for 
indigent individuals, subject to various restrictions on how grant funds could 
be spent, such as restrictions on spending funds to advocate for a ballot 
measures or lobbying.279 Velazquez considered a challenge to a law prohibiting
LSC from funding any organization “that initiates legal representation or 
participates in any other way, in litigation, lobbying, or rulemaking, involving 
an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system.”280  Thus, although 
a recipient attorney could argue that an agency had made an erroneous 
factual determination of eligibility under applicable statutes, the attorney
could not raise arguments against the statute: either that a state statute was
preempted by a federal statute or that either a state or federal statute violated
the U.S. Constitution.281  And, because the law applied to the organization 
receiving funds, and not to the activities, it prohibited the recipient organization 
from undertaking any such suits, even with funds from other sources.282 
The Court decided the case under a limited public forum framework,
even though legal challenges are not primarily “expressive.”283  It  held  
that by funding legal services for indigent people, Congress had created a
forum for advancing the legal arguments of indigent clients.284  The Court
held the funding restrictions distorted the purposes of the program because
it effected a “serious and fundamental restriction on the advocacy of attorneys 
and the functioning of the judiciary.”285  However, the Court was not entirely 
clear if the problem was that the law ran afoul of the purpose of the funding
program, which is clearly covered by the Court’s precedents or the role of 
the judiciary, which is not.286 Justice Scalia, joined by three other Justices, 
278. 
279. 
 531 U.S. 533, 548–49 (2001). 
Id. at 536–37. 
280. Id. at 538. 
281. Id. at 537–39. 
282. Id. at 538. 
283. See id. at 543. 
284. See id. The Court observed that because an attorney, even a government-funded
attorney, represents the views of his clients, the program could not be likened to a “government
speech” case, “even under a generous understanding of the concept.” Id. at 542–43. 
285. Id. at 534. 
286. See id. at 548. 
50
MAY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2018 10:34 AM     
 


















   
 
    
 
        
    
   
 
     
 
 
      
 
[VOL. 55:  1, 2018] Punitive Preemption 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
wrote a strong dissent opining that Congress simply did not create a forum 
with the purpose of challenging welfare laws.287 
Outside of its value as a public forum case, however, Velazquez is 
important for an entirely different reason: it stands for the premise that it
offends the First Amendment for the government to enact policies to “exclude 
from litigation those arguments and theories Congress finds unacceptable 
but which by their nature are within the province of courts to consider.”288 
Specifically, 
[t]he attempted restriction is designed to insulate the Government’s interpretation
of the Constitution from judicial challenge.  The Constitution does not permit the
Government to confine litigants and their attorneys in this manner.  We must be
vigilant when Congress imposes rules and conditions which in effect insulate its 
own laws from legitimate judicial challenge.289 
This position, which was not addressed by the four dissenting Justices,290 
is closely analogous to the principles animating the prohibition on viewpoint 
discrimination discussed above.  Specifically, it conceives of the First 
Amendment as a limitation on governmental actions with impermissible 
motives: here, the motive of foreclosing legal challenges to state laws.
The prohibition on restricting legal challenges is a powerful argument 
against punitive preemption.  Given that “regular” preemption prevents 
preempted local laws from being enforced, the only point of punitive
preemption is to prevent local governments from testing the boundaries 
by passing and defending a law.  Although local officials that believe their 
right to pass laws in a given area is protected by a state constitutional 
provision may sometimes be able to bring a facial challenge against a 
punitive preemption law without triggering the punitive consequences,291
 287. Id. at 555 (Scalia, J. dissenting).  The dissent illustrates the slipperiness in distinguishing
between defining the permissible content of the forum from improper viewpoint discrimination. 




Id. at 546–47.  The Court also found it offensive to separation of powers principles. 
Id. at 548. 
290. The dissenters did not address whether the government may permissibly insulate its
effect: clients were free to pursue their challenges to the law through non-LSC attorneys.
Id. at 554 (Scalia, J. dissenting).  The dissenters concluded the statute “neither prevents anyone
from speaking nor coerces anyone to change speech.” Id. at 558. At a minimum, there is
nothing in Velazquez to suggest past disagreement with the premise that it offends the First 
Amendment to regulate speech so as to insulate laws from challenge. See id. at 547, 553. 
291. For example, in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth a coalition of municipalities
and interest groups brought a challenge directly against the state law that prohibited local 
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an “as-applied” challenge would be difficult to sustain without passing the 
law that triggers the consequences or seeking a disfavored advisory opinion. 
One wrinkle is that punitive preemption does not directly restrict legal 
challenges, as preemption suits are a step or two removed from the passage 
of the law.  Under a typical trajectory, the local officials vote to pass the law; 
the municipal corporation as a legal entity enacts the law; and then the state 
brings a preemption action against the law.  But as has been noted above,
impermissible restrictions may operate at various points in the speech process.
Given that states have the power to preempt local actions and a law found 
preempted will be invalid, the only reason to pass a punitive preemption law
is to avoid the legal fight. Velazquez holds this is impermissible. 
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that the Court’s precedents support a First 
Amendment challenge to punitive preemption laws.  While local lawmaking 
is a not a precise fit with existing precedents, the principles that a state
cannot act with the purpose of limiting public debate, discriminate based 
on viewpoint, or insulate itself from legal challenge, offer each other
significant reinforcement—particularly when viewed in light of the normative
value of encouraging democratic self-government. 
The argument rests in part—although not entirely—on the premise that 
it is not necessarily clear if a local law will be preempted. One of the features
of modern preemption, however, is that it defines in ever-broader terms an
ever-wider swath of regulatory terrain as off-limits for local action.  Even
if a First Amendment challenge may be sustained as a theoretical matter,
such arguments offer little protection against a sufficiently expansive state 
preemption law.  For example, under a law like Kentucky’s H.B. 500, is it
really possible there could be a straight-faced argument that the legislator
did not intend to preempt any local gun law of any kind, anywhere?  To the 
extent that a First Amendment challenge rests on the contested nature of 
preemption, rather than in the unique message conveyed when a local electorate 
translates a policy preference into a law, its applicability will be relatively
limited 
This Article accepts that situations might arise in which no good faith 
arguments exist that a locally desired law is not preempted.292  However, 
it is also important to remember the important role played by state constitutions
fracking regulations, although the case did not involve punitive provisions.  83 A.3d 901, 
913–15 (Pa. 2013). 
292.  A number of the First Amendment arguments discussed above, such as those
involving limitations on public debate, could still be brought to bear. See supra Section 
IV(B)(2)(b). 
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in defining the state’s ability to limit local actions.  Although areas of
recognized home rule immunity remain small and apply only in certain
states,293 home rule protections may play an increasing role as states expand 
their preemptive reach far beyond the areas rendered off-limits in the 
past.294  After all, punitive preemption is a symptom of a larger phenomenon:
a manifestation of a hyper-partisan political climate facilitated by ideologically 
segregated geographic housing preferences.  This larger problem is straining 
doctrinal boundaries,295 including the already strained “state creature” fiction. 
In this context, local governments’ ability to pass laws favored by local
majorities, and then defend them against expansive, ideologically motivated
preemptive laws, is critically important for allowing courts to consider and
define the boundaries of state preemption doctrines under their state 
constitutions.296  In this context, local lawmaking contributes significantly to
democratic deliberation and merits the protection of the First Amendment.
 293. See Diller, supra note 37, at 1066. 
294. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9–841, 11–1611, 41–1002 (Westlaw through 
the First Regular Session 2017 Legis. Sess.).
295. See, e.g, Edward B. Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship: 
A New Principle for Judicial Review of Election Laws, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 655, 660 (2017)
(arguing that partisan gerrymandering should be analyzed under due process rather than
equal protection); Richard E. Levy, The Nonpartisanship Principle, 25 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 377, 390 (2016). The question of whether a party in power can structurally
disadvantage parties out of power will be addressed by the Court in the context of political 
gerrymandering in Gill v. Whitford, argued in the October Term of 2017. Gill v. Whitford, 
QPREPORT, https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/qp/16-01161qp.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3G6L-CP9D].  Interestingly, the lower court decided the case under both First 
and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. See Gill v. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 884 (W.D. 
Wis. 2016). Although primarily a political association case, Justice Kennedy has suggested in
the past that the political gerrymander also implicates expression.  Vieth v. Jubiler, 541 
U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that political gerrymander implicates
the “First Amendment interest [in] not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their 
participation in the electoral process, their voting history, their association with a political 
party, or their expression of political views”).
296. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The ordered working of our 
Republic, and of the democratic process, depends on a sense of decorum and restraint
in all branches of government, and in the citizenry itself.  Here, one has the sense that legislative
restraint was abandoned.”). 
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